097.3
Z1092
No. 1654

RESTRICTED

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis Branch

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
RESTRICTED
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
DOCUMENT SECURITY SECTION

R & A No. 1654

POPULATION DISPLACEMENT OF RUMANIA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE DIVISION
FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN
REF

R&A 1654
Document Security Section

31 December 1943

RECEIVED
JAN 31 1944

If and when this study outlives its usefulness to you, kindly return it to:

Office of Strategic Services,
Director,
Research and Analysis Branch,
25th and E Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

(31059)

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32 as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. Introduction..... 1

II. Movement of Population Out of Rumania

A. Evacuation of the German Minorities..... 6

1. Background and Pre-War Evacuation Plans..... 6

2. Incorporation of Bessarabia and Bukovina by the Soviet Union..... 8

3. The German Minority in Bessarabia and Bukovina... 9

4. Character and Causes of the Repatriation..... 11

5. The Number of Evacuated Germans..... 14

6. Tempo of the Evacuation..... 15

7. Organization of the Evacuation..... 16

8. The Route of the Repatriation..... 18

9. Evacuation from Rumanian Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobrudja..... 23

10. Number, Age and Occupational Distribution of the Evacuated Germans..... 25

11. Fate of the Repatriated Germans..... 27

12. German Folk-Groups left behind in Rumania..... 30

B. Evacuation of Bulgarians from Northern Dobrudja..... 32

1. Evacuation of 1940..... 32

2. Proposed Bulgarian-Rumanian Repatriation Scheme of 1943..... 33

C. Flight of Jews and Soviet-Minded Rumanians to Soviet Areas..... 34

D. Deportation of Jews and Gypsies to Transnistria..... 36

E. Civilian Workers..... 40

F. Repatriation of Magyars..... 42

G. Repatriation of Swedes..... 42

H. Rumanian Volksdeutsche in the Waffen-SS..... 42

I. Russian Emigrés Bound for the German Front..... 43

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

III. Movement of Population into Rumania

A. Repatriation of Rumanians from Southern Dobrudja... 44

B. Rumanian Refugees from Northern Transylvania..... 46

C. Flight of Rumanians from Soviet-incorporated Bessarabia to Rumania Proper..... 49

D. Evacuation from Rumanian Re-conquered Bessarabia... 49

E. The Alleged Repatriation of Rumanians to Transnistria..... 50

F. Evacuation of Rumanians and Deported Jews from Transnistria..... 53

G. Polish Refugees in Rumania..... 53

Table..... 55

I. INTRODUCTION

At the outbreak of the war, Rumania had an estimated population of 19,422,600. In July-September 1940 she was compelled to cede the following territories:

Province	Number of inhabitants	Ceded to
Bessarabia	3,200,000	Soviet Russia
North Bukovina	500,000	" "
South Dobrudja	378,344	Bulgaria
North Transylvania	2,370,000	Hungary

This tremendous loss in area and population was accompanied by a considerable shift of population groups, both in the ceded provinces and in the territory retained by Rumania. In dealing with this population shift it must be taken into account that the movement into and out of Bessarabia is treated regardless of the changes in the territorial status of the province during the period of 1940-41.

The largest of these population movements was the evacuation of the German minorities from Soviet-annexed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina on the one hand, and their removal from Rumanian Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobrudja on the other. A total of 214,000 persons, who registered as Germans, were evacuated in this way.

It must be stressed that this exodus of over two hundred thousand Germans was of a voluntary character and had nothing in common with the compulsory deportations so often practiced by the Reich with regard to the Jews, the Poles, and the Slovenes. Each individual member of the German minority in the above mentioned four provinces had the legal right, under the terms of the German-Soviet Treaty of 5 September, and the Rumanian-German Treaty of 22 October 1940, to decide whether or not he or she wished to leave the country, and they were not deprived of this right in practice. No direct pressure of any kind was exercised either by the governments of Soviet Russia and Rumania, or by the German Umsiedlungskommandos sent over from the Reich.

However, it would be basically wrong to attribute the unanimous decision on the part of the Bessarabian, Bukovina, and Dobrudja Germans to opt for the Reich to purely ideological or national motives. Sympathy with the National Socialist creed and the prestige of the mighty German Reich undoubtedly played a certain role in influencing the Volksdeutsche. But it hardly played the most important part. Through a thorough and unbiased analysis of all the factors involved, it becomes evident that in the case of the 137,000 Germans from the Soviet-incorporated provinces, the mightiest element in favor of repatriation was that of fear -- the almost panic fear of Sovietization with all its economic and political implications. This

same factor also motivated the earlier evacuation of German minorities from the Baltic States in October-December 1939, and from Soviet-incorporated Polish Volhynia, Eastern Galicia, and the Narev region in the winter of 1939-40. Less clear-cut were the motives for the wholesale evacuation of the South Bukovina Germans, who remained under the rule of Rumania and had no reason to fear impending Sovietization. The economic position of the Bukovinian Germans was very weak even before the partition of the province. The incorporation of Northern Bukovina into the Soviet Union resulted in the complete disruption of this province and undoubtedly played an important role in the decision for repatriation. In North Dobrudja, the small German minority was ripe for emigration because of purely economic reasons.

All these are factors which strongly influenced the decision of German minority groups. But factors of this or a similar kind govern most migratory movements. There are always stimuli which push people out of their home country in search of a better and more secure future elsewhere. In this sense, migrations are seldom of a strictly voluntary nature. The evacuation of the German minority groups falls into the above category. Although there existed many factors, mainly negative, which might have influenced the Volksdeutsche in favor of "repatriation" to the Reich, they were at liberty to yield to the pressure of these factors or not. Their decision in favor of expatriation was both voluntary and deliberate. The prospect of receiving free of charge large and rich farms in the German-annexed Polish provinces, as against Sovietization in Bessarabia and North Bukovina and the poor economic conditions in South Bukovina and Dobrudja, was of course the most powerful stimulus. Actually, Rumania, which before the war contained within her borders some 750,000 to 775,000 Volksdeutsche, has within her boundaries today over 500,000. 1/ About two hundred thousand of her former German population emigrated to Greater Germany, 2/ and 66,000 are at present domiciled in Hungarian-annexed Northern Transylvania. Furthermore, about 73,000 Volksdeutsche left Rumania in the ranks of the German Army and the Waffen-SS. The latter, however, did not lose their Rumanian citizenship and the right to return to Rumania after the war.

On a much smaller scale was the repatriation of the some 17,200 Magyars from North Bukovina and Moldavia. The vast majority of the Hungarians who lived in rump Rumania (some four hundred thousand persons) were not affected by this partial evacuation. Following directives handed down by the Hungarian Government, the Magyars of South Transylvania did not opt for return to Hungary, so as not to abandon their position as an outpost of Hungarian revisionist policy.

1/ German sources speak of 550,000 and even 600,000 Volksdeutsche in Rumania. These figures represent, however, either a deliberate exaggeration, or include large groups who did not register as Germans, and have only recently found it expedient to claim German origin.

2/ The number of persons who left Rumania under the provisions of the treaties of 5 September and 22 October 1940, amounts to 214,000. An unascertained though large percentage were persons of non-German ethnic origin, who availed themselves of the possibility of legally leaving the Soviet-annexed territories (see p. 15).

After the repatriation of some 63,500 to 65,000 Bulgarians from Northern Dobrudja in October-November 1940 under the terms of the Craiova Treaty, the Bulgarian minority in Rumania shrank to some 45,000 to 50,000. The repatriation of small Bulgarian groups to Bulgaria proper is still continuing.

By June 1943, of the 757,000 Jews in Rumania (in 1930), not more than 270,000 to 272,000 remained. This striking decrease is only due in part to Rumania's loss of territory. By 1943 Rumania had already reconquered Bessarabia and Bukovina, both of which had a dense Jewish population. The immense decrease in Rumanian Jewry was a result of:

(a) The flight of Jews to Soviet Bessarabia in 1940 and their escape and evacuation to Soviet Russia proper in July 1941, when the Axis Armies invaded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The 1941 flight accounted for up to 130,000.

(b) In October-November 1941, after the creation of the Rumanian-administrated province of Transnistria, some two hundred thousand Jews from Bessarabia, Bukovina, and some from Old Rumania were deported to this province. Most of them perished from hunger and epidemics or were removed farther east.

(c) The pogroms of January and July 1941, the high mortality rate due to the severe and discriminating food restrictions, emigration during the period of 1930-40, and the loss of Jewish communities in the territories ceded to Hungary and Bulgaria.

All the above factors contributed to the striking reduction in the Jewish population of Rumania (from 750,000 to 270,000). Recent reports from Bucharest speak of the impending repatriation to Rumania of the 75,000 Rumanian Jews who have survived two years of existence in Transnistria.

In the movement of non-Rumanian ethnic elements out of Rumania must be included the evacuation of Rumania's small Swedish colony; the departure to the front of some three thousand to five thousand Russian and German emigre volunteers, organized into special military units; and the "experimental" deportation of an unascertained number of gypsies to Transnistria.

The movement of civilian workers from Rumania to Germany is of small consequence. There are only from 4,500 to 5,000 Rumanian workers in the Reich today.

The total movement of population out of Rumania may be estimated at some 630,000 persons.

As a counterpart to the transfer of the 63,000 to 65,000 Bulgarians from Northern Dobrudja, 110,000 Rumanians were repatriated from Southern Dobrudja. About 60 percent of these repatriates were installed in Northern Dobrudja. Taking into account the apparently permanent character of the Rumanian-Bulgarian agreement concerning the partition of Dobrudja, these 65,000 to 67,000 Rumanians colonized in Northern Dobrudja may be considered as permanently settled. The resettlement of the 25,000 Dobrudja Rumanians who were installed in the reconquered provinces of Bessarabia and Bukovina (as far as the northern

part of the latter province is concerned), seems to be very much less stable. These resettlers may face further displacement when and if these provinces are recovered by Soviet Russia. About twenty thousand of the repatriates from Dobrudja have not as yet been assigned to permanent homes.

The problem of the over two hundred thousand Rumanian refugees from Hungarian-annexed North Transylvania is the most complex and provocative. The overwhelming majority of them have retained, in accordance with the intentions of the Rumanian Government and apparently also with their own wishes, the status of unsettled refugees. Thus they may prove an efficacious trump in the political game for the recovery of Northern Transylvania, and at the same time serve as an avant-gard for the eventual Rumanian re-colonization of this area.

All students of the Balkan situation are unanimous in anticipating that, unless an early solution is found, Rumania and Hungary will inevitably try to settle their differences by force, as soon as the present war is over. Several writers who approach this question from a different point of view, have expressed the firm belief that only a far-reaching exchange of populations will prevent an open conflict. Bernard Newman, who made a thorough study on the scene of all the European nationality questions, states that "Transylvania above all the disputed areas of Europe needs an ethnic sorting out." Newman favors an expansion of the original plan developed by the Rumanian delegation in Turnu Severin, that is an equitable rectification of the existing frontier and an exchange of population (see p. 46). 1/ The same conviction is voiced by Charles Upson Clark, who represents the Rumanian point of view, 2/ and by Dr. J. Robinson, one of the outstanding students of European minority problems, 3/ who has no ax to grind.

Some 35,000 to 40,000 Rumanians fled from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to Rumania proper in June 1940, when these provinces were occupied by Soviet troops. In November 1943 the rapid advance of the Soviet Armies precipitated the evacuation of Rumanian officials and of masses of civilian population from Bessarabia to the Old Kingdom.

A projected "repatriation" of persons of Rumanian stock living in the Axis-occupied Soviet areas beyond the Bug River never materialized. Thousands of Rumanian officials, employees, and business men, transferred to the Rumanian-ruled province of Transnistria in Soviet Southern Ukraine, are now being evacuated from this territory to Rumania proper.

A total of from 350,000 to 375,000 Rumanians have entered Rumania since 1940. Thus Rumania has suffered a net migratory loss of some 250,000 to 280,000 persons.

1/ Newman, Bernard. The New Europe, New York, 1943, pp. 269, 270,287.

2/ Clark, Charles Upson. Racial Aspects of Rumania's Case, 1941, p. 19.

3/ Robinson, Dr. Jacob. "Minorities in a Free World", Free World, May 1943, p. 454.

(31059)

This report gives special attention to the evacuation of the Bessarabian Germans, and deals in greater detail with every aspect of this particular movement, than it does with any of the other transfers. This seeming disproportion is intentional. The evacuation of the 93,000 Germans from Bessarabia may be regarded as the model evacuation of its kind. As such, the data on the Bessarabian German repatriation to be found in German sources, is incomparably richer than that on Bukovina or Dobrudja.

II. MOVEMENT OF POPULATION OUT OF RUMANIA

A. Evacuation of the German Minorities

1. Background and Pre-War Evacuation Plans. According to the census of 1930, there were in Rumania 740,169 Germans. They constituted 4 percent of the total population of the country. After Czechoslovakia, with its approximately 3,300,000 Germans, the Soviet Union with 1,424,534, and Poland with over 1,100,000, Rumania contained within its borders the most numerous German minority in Europe. In 1940, according to German sources, the largest population centers of Germans in Rumania were the following: 1/

Banat	310,000
Transylvania	219,000
Bessarabia	86,000
Bukovina	80,000
Dobrudja	15,000

Rumors of the imminent evacuation of these German minorities from Rumania followed close on Hitler's Reichstag speech of 6 October 1939, in which he announced the Reich's new repatriation policy with regard to the German minorities scattered throughout Eastern and Southeastern Europe. On 18 October 1939, the following Czernowitz report to the official French news agency Havas appeared in the Paris Poslednia Novosti:

"Insistent rumors about the impending repatriation of Germans from Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania are circulating here. Professor Meyer of the Czernowitz University is now in Berlin, where he is conducting negotiations in this connection. The Lutheran bishop of Transylvania, Glonds, has arrived in Berlin with a view to similar negotiations."

On the same day, a cable from Czernowitz appeared in La France (Bordeaux), which spoke of a proposed evacuation of Germans from Bessarabia and Bukovina, but did not mention Transylvania. On 27 October, the Bucharest correspondent of the New York Times informed his newspaper that "it is understood that the Germans of Bukovina and Banat would be expected to return to Germany; nothing is yet being said about the minority in Transylvania." Actually there were rumors concerning the evacuation of the German minorities from all the Rumanian provinces.

1/ According to the census of 3 November 1940, taken by the Institut fuer Statistik und Bevoelkerungspolitik der deutschen Volksgruppe in Rumaenien in Nation und Staat, March 1941, p. 201. Stump, Dr. Karl. "Das Deutschtum in Bessarabien," Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik, October 1940, p. 504. Arz, Dr. W. "Das Deutschtum des Buchenlandes," Nation und Staat, November 1940, p. 20. Handbuch fuer die Schulungsarbeit in der HI (Hitlerjugend). Vom Deutschen Volk und seinem Lebensraum. /English edition: The Nazi Primer, New York-London, 1938, p. 157./

In the New York Times of 25 October 1939, its Bucharest correspondent described the reaction of the German minorities to these rumors as that of "consternation." The above mentioned Havas cable from Czernowitz also spoke of "a great anxiety." In all the various provinces the reaction of the Germans seem to have been much the same. This of course hardly means that Hitler and National Socialism had no enthusiastic supporters among the Rumanian Germans. A very pertinent explanation of their attitude appeared in the Bulletin of International News of 9 March 1940, which stated that "Nazi organization had made great headway among the Germans in Southeastern Europe, especially among the younger people... It is one thing to sympathize with Nazi philosophy -- such sympathy was perhaps inevitable. But it is another thing to be uprooted from the home and the farm, which has been in the family for generations, and be transferred to Germany, a strange country to the migrant, or to a hostile environment in Poland."

According to the New York Times the prosperous Swabian peasants in the Banat were particularly disturbed. Several had applied to the French consulate at Timisoara for advice, pointing out that their forefathers were settlers from Alsace-Lorraine who had come to the Banat in the eighteenth century under the sponsorship of Maria Theresa. 1/

In Transylvania the reaction was not quite as unanimous. A Bucharest cable in the New York Times of 30 November stated that "this German minority is not united; some favor repatriation but the majority are definitely opposed." And according to the above quoted Bulletin of International News:

"The only German minorities in Rumania likely to agree willingly to transfer were those of Bukovina, bordering on Soviet-occupied Poland, and those of Bessarabia, who have no chance of enlarging their land holdings and who fear possible Soviet invasion." 2/

However, even the German minorities of these provinces did not tangibly manifest any favorable reaction to the evacuation. The Rumanian Government seems to have favored the repatriation of its German citizens. Independently of possible national and political motives, financial considerations played an understandable part in determining the government's position. The Bucharest correspondent of the New York Times in a cable dated October 27th expressed certainty that the Rumanian Government would not object to the repatriation of the Germans and gave the following explanation:

"Rumanian exports to the Reich have obtained high levels, while imports remain below the normal figures. As a result, Germany owes Rumania a considerable debt that could be cancelled by the sale of properties of repatriated Germans."

However, neither the fall of 1939 nor the first part of 1940 saw any steps taken on the part of the Reich towards

---

1/ The New York Times, 25 October 1939. La France, Bordeaux, 22 October 1939.

2/ "German Minorities in Europe", Bulletin of International News, No. 5, 9 March 1940.

(31059)

the realization of the rumored repatriation plan. This reticence was interpreted as a silent decision on the part of the Reich to abandon, at least for the time being, any repatriation scheme for German minorities in Rumania. As a matter of fact, the general situation in the fall and winter of 1939-40 gave Germany sufficient reason to refrain from evacuating the German minority groups from Rumania. These reasons were as follows:

(a) The resolute opposition on the part of the most important and the best organized German minority groups: those of the Banat and Transylvania.

(b) During this period the Reich was occupied with the repatriation of Germans from Estonia, Latvia, Volhynia, Galicia, and the Narev region, and it would have been extremely difficult to simultaneously carry out an analogous operation with respect to the entire German minority of Rumania, which numbered many hundreds of thousands. It was also not practicable both from a political and psychological point of view, to single out for evacuation only one or two of the German minority groups (for instance those of Bessarabia and Transylvania or Dobrudja). To do so would have meant the admission on the part of the Reich that these particular provinces were threatened by Russia, Hungary, or Bulgaria even before any of these countries had made a move.

(c) The willingness of the Rumanian Government not only to permit its citizens of German origin to leave, but also to accept their property in payment of Germany's debts on Rumanian imports (see p. 7) compelled the leaders of the Reich to seriously consider whether immediate evacuation was either advisable or advantageous.

(d) The burdensome process of settling the already repatriated German minorities in the newly annexed western provinces of Poland produced a hesitancy to rush into the transfer of any large new group.

Thus the question of evacuating the Rumanian Germans was dropped until the second half of 1940, when the altered political situation again brought to the fore that factor which has become the traditional stimulus for all the repatriations of German minorities: Soviet Russia.

2. Incorporation of Bessarabia and Bukovina by the Soviet Union. On 26 June 1940, immediately following the fall of France, the Soviet Government presented Rumania with an ultimatum demanding the cession to the USSR of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina. Advised to comply by Germany, the Rumanian Government acceded the following day.

The German Ambassador to Moscow had been officially informed of the Soviet demands concerning Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina on 24 June, two days before the Soviet ultimatum was presented to Rumania. According to a statement made by the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop a year later, on 22 June 1941, the Ambassador had immediately replied that the fulfillment of the Soviet territorial demands "would lead to the disruption of the life of a large German settlement in Bessarabia." 1/

1/ The New York Times, 23 June 1941.

A completely new situation was thus created. The equality of status of the German minorities in all of the Rumanian provinces, noted above (see p. 8) no longer existed, as Bessarabia was entirely separated from Rumania, and Bukovina partly so. It now became possible to disregard the Germans of Banat and Transylvania, and to repatriate only those of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, these provinces having fallen under Soviet rule. With regard to the Soviet-incorporated territories, the pattern already used in the evacuation of German minorities from other regions which had come into the sphere of interest or under the rule of the USSR, was followed almost automatically.

3. The German Minority in Bessarabia and Bukovina. Both Bessarabia and Bukovina contained a large and prosperous German minority:

(a) Bessarabia. Bessarabian Germans first settled in this province after it was annexed by Russia under the terms of the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1812. During the period of 1814-42 some eight thousand Germans from Swabia, the Palatinate and Southern Germany accepted the invitation of the Russian Government to settle in Bessarabia. The Russian census of 1897 counted 60,206 Germans (3.1 percent of the total population). A survey made by the German national organizations in 1922 showed that there were 80,162 Germans in Bessarabia, thus indicating a tenfold increase in the course of one century. In 1939, despite the fact that from 1857 to 1939 about 25,000 Germans had emigrated from Bessarabia, either overseas or to Dobrudja, their number reached 86,000. 1/

According to official Rumanian statistics, over 96 percent of the Bessarabian Germans lived in the villages. Almost 82 percent of the working population was more or less directly connected with agriculture. They were also in large measure a land-owning group. In 1938 they owned 741,300 acres of land. The average size of a German peasant farm in Southern Bessarabia was 19.4 acres, while the average for Rumanian farms did not exceed 9.8 acres. 2/

1/ Von Stamati, T. "Die Deutschen Bessarabiens." Nation und Staat, November 1940, p. 52. Wolf, Herbert. Die Bevoelkerungsentwicklung der deutschen Volksgruppen in Europa, Erlangen 1938, p. 100. Stump, Dr. Karl. "Das Deutschtum in Bessarabien." Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik, October 1940, p. 504. Also: Karte der deutschen Siedlungen in Bessarabien, 1927, and Deutschtum in Bessarabien, Berlin 1937. Leibbrand. Die deutschen Kolonien in Cherson und Bessarabien, 1927. "Die deutschen Volksgruppen der neuen Rueckfuehrung in ihrem bauerlichen Bestand." Neues Bauerntum, August 1940, pp. 279-280. Der Volksdeutsche, November 1939. Mueller, Wilhelm. "Heimkehr vom Schwarzen Meer." Das Reich, 15 September 1940.

2/ Brunner, Dr. Heinz. "Biologische und soziologische Streiflichter auf das Suedostdeutschtum." Nation und Staat, August-September 1940, pp. 364-367. Schobel, Sepp. "Zur Lage des deutschen landwirtschaftlichen Grundbesitzes in Rumaenien." Volk und Heimat, October 1938. Nation und Staat, November 1940, pp. 16-22, 54.

The Bessarabian Germans were thus a sound and prosperous local ethnic group, with no desire to leave their 125 years old settlements. However, immediately Bessarabia came under the rule of the Soviet Union, the Germans concocted a theory, according to which the Bessarabian Germans had long felt the urge to leave this region for the Reich. Dr. L. Oberascher, editor of the Suedost-Echo (Vienna), who directed the evacuation from Bessarabia, asserted that German emigrants from Bessarabia, who in the years 1920-30 had preferred America, began after the creation of the Third Reich to seriously consider a return to the homeland:

"The painful administrative conditions prevailing in Bessarabia aggravated the latent unrest... every Bessarabian peasant wondered whether it would not be better to return to the Reich. Individual peasants attempted to return at their own risk." 1/

However, as a matter of fact, no such desire for "repatriation" manifested itself until the province was occupied by Russia. Dr. Oberascher himself stated:

"When the revision of the Rumanian-Russian frontier severed the link between the Bessarabian Germans and the other German national groups of Rumania, no one doubted that the day for the return into the Fatherland had arrived."

Another German author, T. von Stamati, attributed the evacuation of Bessarabian Germans exclusively to the newly created political situation, apart from any historical considerations: 2/

"The political events made necessary the transfer of the Bessarabian Germans... Conditions having changed, this national group would in any case not have been able to maintain itself by its own means."

The same opinion was voiced in an article on Rumania published in the October issue of Nation und Staat: 3/

"As a result of the transfer of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to Soviet sovereignty, the problem of repatriating the Germans of these regions, which had been considered even before, was given practical attention sooner than was expected. The fact that these Germans had to be repatriated was self-evident... Consequent to their coming under Soviet Russia's rule, the situation of these national fragments cannot be consolidated."

(b) Bukovina. The systematic settlement of Germans in Bukovina commenced in 1774, after the Austrian Armies occupied the province. 4/ In 1940, on the eve of its partition

---

1/ Suedost-Echo, 27 September 1940.

2/ Nation und Staat, November 1940, p. 54.

3/ Nation und Staat, October 1940, pp. 32-33.

4/ Bahr, Richard. Deutsches Schicksal in Suedosten, Hamburg 1936, p. 162.

between the Soviet Union and Rumania, Bukovina had a German population of between 70,000 1/ and 85,000. 2/ The economic structure of the Bukovina Germans was far from being as sound and normal as that of the Bessarabian Volksdeutsche. Only 25.3 percent of the Bukovinian Germans were engaged in agriculture, and about a quarter (5,800) of the total number of 23,000 German farmers owned no land of their own. The average farm was much smaller than in Bessarabia: about 45 percent of German peasants possessed less than 1.25 acres. On the other hand their representation in the civil service was abnormally high. Of the total German population some 17 percent (11,700) worked for the administration or in the liberal professions. 3/ As long as Bukovina had been a province of Austria-Hungary and the entire state machinery was principally German, it had been possible to maintain this disproportionate percentage of professional intelligentsia. However, in November 1918, when Bukovina came under Rumanian rule, the Germans naturally lost their privileged position and found it very difficult to adjust themselves to the new situation.

These circumstances provided German propaganda with excellent material in proof of the historical and sociological soundness of the 1940 evacuation of the Bukovinian Germans. In an article entitled "Germans in Bukovina," published in Nation und Staat of November 1940, Dr. Wilhelm Arz attempted to formulate a theory on the "basic" abnormality of the German ethnic group in Bukovina, thereby indicating that a voluntary, organized repatriation of Germans from Bukovina had long been overdue.

Nevertheless, it was not until the summer of 1940 that any trend toward repatriation made itself manifest, since no one had foreseen that the USSR would lay claim to this territory, as well as to Bessarabia.

The sudden and immediately satisfied demands of the Soviet Union brought about the partition of Bukovina into two parts: Northern Bukovina, with a territory of 1,737 square miles and a population of five hundred thousand, was incorporated into the USSR; the southern part (2,298 square miles and 345,000 inhabitants) was retained by Rumania. The German minority of Bukovina was thus split into two approximately equal parts. As it had in Bessarabia, the radical and sudden change in the national and social status of the region brought the repatriation problem into the foreground.

4. Character and Causes of the Repatriation. Negotiations for the proposed transfer of the German minority began in Moscow on 25 July. They lasted for forty-two days. A treaty was finally concluded on 5 September 1940. Neither

---

1/ Wolf, Herbert. Die Bevoelkerungsentwicklung der deutschen Volksgruppen in Europa, Erlangen 1938.

2/ Bahr, Richard. Deutsches Schicksal in Suedosten, Hamburg 1936.

3/ "Die deutschen Volksgruppen der neuen Rueckfuehrung in ihrem baeuerlichen Bestand." Neues Bauerntum, August 1940, pp. 281-282.

its text nor any more or less detailed account of its contents has ever been published. Both sides issued brief releases, announcing the ratification of the treaty and nothing more. There is no official data concerning the underlying principles of this agreement. It is practically certain, however, that these principles were analogous to those governing the agreement of 3 November 1939, which provided for the evacuation of Germans from the Soviet-incorporated former Polish territories of Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and the Narev area. Assuming that this is correct, the agreement concerning Bessarabia and Bukovina must have provided for a voluntary evacuation. There are no indications that the unrestricted right of option was denied the Volksdeutsche in practice. The German Umsiedlungskommando (see p. 16) sent by the Reich had no authority on Soviet territory to enforce the evacuation of the Bessarabian and Bukovina Germans. The resettlement squads, however, were in a position to exercise strong psychological pressure. There is also no data to indicate compulsion on the part of the Soviet authorities in favor of evacuation. Neither before nor after the Soviet-German break were acts of political terror, national discrimination, or social violence directed against Germans, mentioned in the abundant German literature on the events surrounding the transfer. On the contrary, all the more so because it foresaw the coming removal, did the Soviet Government show special consideration for the German population. As noted by Nation und Staat, "the bulk of the German population in both the ceded provinces remained in their homes according to instructions from the German authorities... They were not in the least interfered with either with regard to their life or their property. From the outset, Russian troops and authorities showed them the most complete consideration." The Soviet Government not only refrained from using forcible means in the evacuation of the Volksdeutsche, but according to Dr. Oberascher, the local Soviet authorities had even hoped that not more than 30 to 50 percent of the Bessarabian Germans would opt for repatriation. An attempt was actually made to prevent the younger German generation from registering in the repatriation lists. The Soviet-German agreement of 5 September 1940 provided that the decision of the parents was valid for the entire family. Nevertheless, Soviet representatives demanded that the children appear personally before the German-Soviet commission to cast their votes. Dr. Oberascher stated that the Soviet members of the commission "attempted by continuous questioning of the children to separate them from their parents, and frightened them so, that as a result, the children declared their decision to stay."

Dr. Oberascher stated that "this Soviet attempt at sabotage ended in failure." 1/ The official German historiography explains this by the fact that the Bessarabian Germans had from the very beginning made up their minds in favor of repatriation. According to Alfred Thoss "in Bessarabian German villages it was almost unnecessary to hang posters on the houses notifying the Germans to register for the forthcoming evacuation and enumerating what everyone was entitled to take with him. These people eagerly awaited the day when they might register; in most cases they donned their holiday clothes

---

1/ Oberascher, Dr. Leonhard. "Sowjetrussische Sabotage-Kunst", Suedost-Echo, 5 July 1941.

and asked only about the best way to pack their belongings and when could their transport leave... In certain villages, all the Germans had registered for evacuation in the space of only a few days." 1/

This attitude on the part of the Bessarabian Germans is corroborated by the Countess Waldeck, who visited the assembling transit camp at Galatz and who talked with the evacuees personally. She described their mood as follows:

"Old and young, rich and poor, expressed a minimum of regret and a boundless confidence in their future in the Fuehrer's Germany. These prolific descendants of prolific colonists were returning to Hitler's Germany as to the Promised Land."

These descriptions are undoubtedly exaggerated and embellished. It is difficult to believe that all of the repatriates opted for transfer purely on national and patriotic grounds, particularly as they did not represent a solidly organized National Socialist community. Almost on the eve of the evacuation, Alfred Bonfert sorrowfully stated that "the German population of Bessarabia has no city inhabitants and but few craftsmen, merchants and men of liberal professions, which fact, of course, makes the organization of this German group considerably more difficult." 2/

The Bessarabian Germans registered for evacuation to a man. It must have required powerful stimuli to set this mass of over ninety thousand people in motion, deeply rooted as they were. As in the previous cases of evacuation involving the Baltic countries and the Polish regions, the decisive factor for the Bessarabian Germans was the tremendous fear of Sovietization. While the general peasant population of Bessarabia may well have welcomed reunion with Russia, because isolation from the Russian markets had spelled economic ruin, and because the Rumanian Government had completely neglected the needs of Bessarabian economy, the Germans, a predominantly prosperous farmer group, knew the fate that was in store for them as kulaks. They knew that by absorption into the kolkhozes they would lose the farms which they had acquired with so much toil and effort. At any rate, Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrer-Korps (NSKK) sent to organize the evacuation made widespread and successful use of this argument.

However, this was not the only reason the Bessarabian Germans had for fearing the Soviet regime. The Bessarabian Communists, who had now acceded to power, had bloody scores of a political nature to settle with them. In September 1924, in the region of the village of Tatarbunary, a peasant revolt against the Rumanian administration was suppressed by the Rumanian police with the assistance of the Army and the Marines. The revolt was organized by the local Communists. According to von Stamati, in Nation und Staat, the German colonists who were strongly anti-communist and wished to prove

---

1/ Zeitschrist fuer Geopolitik, March 1941.

2/ Bonfert, Albert. "Die Aufgaben der Deutschen Volksgruppe in Rumaenien." Volk und Reich, 1940, No. 4, p. 305.

their loyalty to the new authorities, took a very active part in the suppression of this revolt. 1/ Soviet sources affirm that the village of Tatarbunary and a number of neighboring villages were entirely burned down; more than one thousand peasants were killed in the fighting and murdered in captivity, while over five hundred were turned over to a military court, in October 1924. 2/ Von Stamati complained that the Rumanian Government had not appreciated this gesture of the Bessarabian Germans and had repaid them only with ingratitude. But in the memory of the Bessarabian peasantry and the Communists the episode of Tatarbunary had left bloody traces which did not augur well for the German colonists.

Countess R.G. Waldeck recalls that as early as 27 June, a few days before the entry of the Soviet troops into Bessarabia and Bukovina, the first German refugees from these regions had begun to appear in the Hotel Athene Palace in Bucharest. Apparently they had been warned quite some time before by German Embassy in Bucharest:

"No one else in the two provinces had an inkling yet that the Russians were coming. The German land-owners had lost no time in getting out while the going was good. What made them flee in such a hurry was not so much fear of the invading Bolsheviki as fear that the people of the two provinces themselves, once they learned of the coming of the Russians, might get out of hand and begin to loot and kill." 3/

As to the Bukovina Germans, the same fear of Sovietization, added to economic instability (see p. 10) was the most powerful factor to motivate their mass evacuation.

5. The Number of Evacuated Germans. Dr. Oberascher in the Suedost-Echo of 27 October 1940, quoted Rumanian estimates, as of 30 June 1940, according to which the total number of Germans in Northern Bukovina, Middle, and Southern Bessarabia (that is in the former Rumanian regions recently taken over by Russia) amounted to 122,400 persons. He indicated, however, that this data certainly does not provide any exact estimate of the number of Germans to be transferred. The results of the transfer can thus deviate substantially from Rumanian figures.

The difference has, indeed, proved to be considerable. The number of Germans evacuated from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was 135,989 rather than 122,400, i.e., all the Germans listed in Rumanian statistics to the very last man, plus 13,589 or 11 percent more.

The number evacuated thus exceeded not only the figures of official Rumanian statistics, but also the estimates on the size of the German population of these two regions made by the Germans themselves. According to Rumanian data there were, in

---

1/ Von Stamati, T. "Die Deutschen Bessarabiens." Nation und Staat, November 1940.

2/ Bolshava Sovietskaya Entsikclopedya, Vol. VI, p. 31. Kritszman, L. Boyarskaya Rumyniya vo vlasty Gitlera, Moscow 1941, p. 22

3/ Waldeck, Countess R.G. Athene Palace, New York, 1942.

1940, 81,087 Germans in Bessarabia; according to German sources there were 85,000; however, the number evacuated from Bessarabia, according to data of the German Einwandererzentrale was 93,548, or respectively 11,500 and 8,500 more than the number of Germans according to the above estimates. The available data on Northern Bukovina is contradictory. Neues Bauerntum estimated the number of Germans in the part of Bukovina that came under Soviet rule at 27,700 (15,100 in the city and region of Czernowitz) and it was expected that no more than 25,000 Germans would be repatriated from this section. 1/ According to Karl G. von Loesch, writing in Volk und Reich, Rumanian official statistics listed 35,000 Germans in Northern Bukovina; the number of Germans evacuated was 42,441, or almost 15,000 (34 percent) and 7,500 (17 percent) more respectively. 2/

Where did these additional thousands of Germans come from? It is possible that a certain number of them were assimilated (Rumanianized, Ukrainianized, or Russified) elements of German origin. In normal times, they did not consider themselves to be Germans, and therefore had not been registered as such either by Rumanian or German census counts. Because of social standing or political views, many of them may not have wished to remain under the Soviet regime. The only legal possibility for leaving was to be repatriated under the German-Soviet agreement. Thus they availed themselves of the opportunity to leave, by recalling their German descent. However, their number could hardly have amounted to either 8,500 (and certainly not 11,500) in Bessarabia or 7,500 (and 15,000) in Bukovina. By analogy with the Baltic States and Volhynia, there is every reason to believe that a considerable portion of the "stateless" persons, white Russian emigrés, Ukrainian nationalists, and even some "bourgeois and anti-Soviet elements" were included in the number of persons evacuated from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina on the basis of the agreement of 5 September. The German evacuation authorities seem to have been very lenient on this score, and these persons encountered no difficulty in getting themselves placed on the lists of Germans to be repatriated. The Soviet authorities on their part also placed no obstacles in the way. As far as can be determined by available data, there were no serious disagreements between the Soviet and the German authorities concerning either the interpretation of the repatriation agreement, or its application.

6. Tempo of the Evacuation. The evacuation from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was carried out at an extraordinary pace. The Soviet-German negotiations originally provided that the evacuation from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was to be completed within two months, between the beginning of September and 15 November 1940. Actually the allotted time was cut almost in half. According to the Hamburger Monatshefte fuer Auswaertige Politik, 3/ 90,294 Germans were evacuated from Bessarabia between 23 September and 22 October 1940 (in thirty-one days). The removal of the 42,441 Germans from Bukovina

---

1/ Neues Bauerntum, August 1940, p. 282.

2/ Volk und Reich, 1940, No. 12, p. 798.

3/ Hamburger Moratshefte fuer Auswaertige Politik, 1940, p. 878.

began somewhat later and was completed at approximately the same time as the evacuation from Bessarabia. Thus the total number of persons evacuated in thirty-one days was 132,700 or 4,280 per day. Furthermore, as 88 percent of the Bessarabians and 25 percent of the Bukovinians were peasants, the livestock they were permitted to take with them (two oxen, two horses, one cow and ten head of poultry) amounted to many tens of thousands. The transportation of this vast mass of people, cattle and property over a period of only thirty-one days was an exceedingly difficult task. However the German transport organization succeeded in carrying it out.

7. Organization of the Evacuation. In organizing the evacuation from Bessarabia, the Reich did not enlist the help of either voluntary or mobilized local German elements from among the evacuees themselves, as had been the case in Estonia and especially in Latvia. Here too, as was done in Galicia and Volhynia, the task of evacuation was placed in the hands of the Umsiedlungskommando, a group of specially trained men, sent from the Reich. Nation und Staat stressed the fact that "during the preceding transplantations, valuable experience had been collected," 1/ which could now be utilized. It is clear that the Germans had learned not to entrust so complicated and difficult a job to local volunteers, no matter how zealous. Dr. Oberascher in the Suedost-Echo article of 27 September wrote:

"Several hundred men wearing semi-military uniforms, remained in Bessarabia for six weeks in order to carry out the liquidation of the properties, the transfer of women and children, of the sick and convalescent, and finally to accompany them beyond the frontier."

These evacuation squads worked as the representatives of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. 2/ This agency was in charge of the immediate transfer of the various German minority groups from their respective countries as well as of the investigation of settlement possibilities. The Umsiedlungskommando crossed the new Soviet frontier at Reni on 14 September. According to a carefully prepared plan, Bessarabia was divided into four regions comprising thirty to forty villages each; Northern Bukovina constituted a fifth and separate region. The administrative hierarchy was headed by a central authority established in Tarutino. Regional agents were responsible to the central authority and local agents to the regional agent. It was the job of the local agents (together with an equal number of Soviet representatives) to register those who wished to be repatriated, to evaluate homes and harvests left behind, property accounts and so forth.

A similar procedure was applied in Northern Bukovina. The Umsiedlungskommando to Bukovina was headed by Standartenfuehrer Hoffmeyer, who had been in charge of the evacuation of Germans from the eastern regions of Poland in 1939-40. 3/

1/ Nation und Staat, October 1940, p. 32.

2/ Carstens, Peter. "Aus der Praxis der volksdeutschen Umsiedlung." Neues Bauerntum, April 1941.

3/ Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik, March 1941, p. 167.

Hoffmeyer worked in close cooperation with the Deutsches Fuersorgeamt in Czernovitz, which was created immediately after the entry of Russian troops. 1/

8. The Route of the Repatriation. The problem of transportation from Bessarabia and Bukovina was a great deal more complex than in preceding operations of this kind. From Latvia and Estonia it had been possible to transport evacuees directly by sea, aboard German ships, from Tallinn, Perno, Riga, and Libau, to Stettin or Gottenhafen. Whereas the Polish regions and Lithuania have a common frontier with the Reich, Bessarabia and Bukovina do not border on Germany. Therefore as stated in Nation und Staat, "the emigrants have to be transferred homewards through the territories of two (or even three) foreign states." 2/

The evacuation from Bessarabia presented the most problems; firstly because of the absence of a common frontier with the Reich, and secondly because the German evacuation authorities chose to complicate matters still further. Logically Bessarabia's geographical position would indicate either of two repatriation routes: the shortest leading north, from Bessarabia through Bukovina and Soviet Eastern Galicia into the incorporated Polish regions, destined as the new home of the Bessarabian Germans; the second route crossing from East to West through Rumania and Hungary into Southern Austria, whence the repatriates would still have to make the long journey through Austria and the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia (or Slovakia) to the Warthegau and the Gau of Danzig-West Prussia. Neither of these two routes was chosen. The evacuees followed a third route, the longest of all. Nation und Staat describes this trail as follows:

"They /the evacuees/ will first be brought by wagons or trucks sent by the Reich to the embarkation ports of Reni and Chilia at the mouth of the Danube, or to the first reception camp at Galatz. From there they will sail on Danube steamers as far as the migration camps at Zemlino and Prahovo in Yugoslavia, from where the journey will be continued by train." 3/

Nation und Staat, however, neglected to mention that the continuation of the journey would necessitate the crossing of Hungary from east to west, and then on to Southern Austria, whence only a long and complicated trip would bring them to the Polish regions.

No explanation as to why this particularly long and circuitous route was chosen has appeared in the German press. On the basis of the political situation, in the early autumn of 1940, these reasons may have been as follows:

(a) The shortest way geographically, through Soviet Eastern Galicia, presented the Reich with the greatest difficulties from the political standpoint. The transportation of

---

1/ Mueller, Wilhelm. "Heimkehr vom Schwarzen Meer." Das Reich, 15 September 1940.

2/ Nation und Staat, October 1940, p. 33.

3/ Ibid.

(31059)

93,000 Bessarabian Germans across Soviet territory would again leave the Reich dependent on the good will of the Soviet authorities, and would bring the repatriates into direct contact with Soviet Russia. Despite mutual declarations of friendship, there was no guarantee that the Soviet Government would permit such a mass transit. If the answer to this request had been favorable, the Reich would once more be in the position of having received a favor from its Soviet partner. It is also possible that the directors of the evacuation felt no real confidence with regard to the capacity of the Soviet railway and particularly the highways, since many of the evacuees, with carts and cattle, were travelling by road.

(b) The motives which induced the Reich to ignore the Rumania-Hungary itinerary are less clear. Political considerations could not have played a role here. At that time Rumania had already entered the Axis orbit and the transfer of the repatriates through this country would certainly have presented fewer difficulties than their passage through Yugoslavia, whose population was far from pro-German. It is possible that the Rumanian railways did not have the facilities to transport such a mass of men, livestock, and belongings over so short a period. However, the Reich might have sent its own trains as it did somewhat later in the repatriation of Germans from Northern Bukovina.

(c) It would seem therefore that the choice of the roundabout route across Yugoslavia and Hungary over the two shorter routes was not the result of either a foreign policy or technical difficulties, but was prompted by very different motives:

Those in charge of the repatriation were not at all pleased with the prospect of the immediate transfer of 93,000 Bessarabian Germans into new territory, in, as it were, a "raw state." Just as in the case of the evacuation from Volhynia and Galicia, they preferred the repatriates first to pass through a number of intermediary camps in which they would undergo a preliminary survey and sifting as to their political and racial reliability, occupational status, etc. During the comparatively long circuitous passage through Galatz, along the length of the Danube, Belgrade, Hungary, Southern Austria, this task could be accomplished much more thoroughly and surely than during the much shorter railway trip through Rumania-Hungary. As noted in Wirtschaft und Statistik a preliminary statistical survey of the 93,500 Germans repatriated from Bessarabia was conducted during their trip on the lower and middle Danube. 1/

On the other hand, there was no reason for hurry from the point of view of establishing the Bessarabian repatriates in their new homes in the annexed Polish provinces. The process of settling the previously evacuated Germans from the Baltic countries and from Volhynia and Galicia proved to be much slower than had been expected. These repatriates were not by any means all installed on the farms and in the enterprises taken from the banished Poles. Tens of thousands were

---

1/ Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 7, p. 150.

still in various camps on Reich territory. There could therefore be no question of the immediate transfer into the annexed Polish regions of the 93,000 evacuees from Bessarabia. Any possible delay was desirable. The Reich had been in a great hurry to get the evacuees out of Bessarabia. Having removed them from Soviet territory there was no longer any need for haste. Thus the circuitous route suited the Reich's intentions perfectly.

On the basis of the fragmentary data published to date we will attempt to reconstruct this Bessarabian German anabasis.

On 23 September, nine days after the Umsiedlungskommando began its work, the first transport of evacuated Germans left a Bessarabian village; it was composed of eight hundred persons and forty trucks, which had been provided by the Reich. Of the total number of evacuated Germans, 30,641 (34.5 percent) were transported by truck. This means of transportation was utilized especially for women, old people, children, and for those peasants who had no horses of their own and therefore could not travel by cart. 1/ The long columns were divided up into sections with a certain number of the NSKK commanding each section. Every night the returning Germans were bivouacked in camps, where rations were served them from special food trucks. 2/ These motor transports were bound for Reni and Chilia. However, when the autumn rains began, making the roads impracticable for heavy vans and trucks, railway trains, and wagons were utilized.

According to Thoss, "the Soviet representatives obligingly placed at the disposal /of the Germans/ a greater number of trains than had been stipulated." This facilitated the evacuation of 22,337 (25 percent of the total number). The remainder travelled to the frontier in carts (15,373 persons, 17 percent), and covered wagons (20,301, 23 percent). Just as had the evacuees from Galicia and Volhynia, they preferred a long and difficult journey by cart and wagon because, as Thoss pointed out, "the advantage of the wagon consisted in that two horses and a cartload of property could be taken by the evacuees." Those who travelled by train had to leave much of their property behind. Long caravans of wagons stretched out along the Bessarabian steppes.

Countess Waldeck, who was present at the arrival of the first group on Rumanian territory, wrote:

"I saw a spectacle which reminded me of engravings of the American frontier era: a long line of wagons, covered with white canvas, oxen drawn, sometimes with a colt or a horse running alongside. It was strange to find the covered wagon, America's symbol of individual pioneering, become Europe's symbol of the totally protective state." 3/

1/ Thoss, Alfred. "Die Umsiedlung der Volksdeutschen aus Bessarabien, der Bukovina und der Dobrudscha." Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik, March 1941.

2/ Christian Science Monitor, 11 November 1940.

3/ Waldeck, Countess R.G. Athene Palace, New York, 1942, p. 305.

(31059)

The immediate destinations of the evacuees were the Danubian ports of Reni and Chilia, now Soviet; then across the Prut River to the Rumanian shore. The Countess Waldeck gives the following eye-witness account of this crossing:

"Two bridges being blown up by the Rumanians when Bessarabia was occupied by the Russians, the Rumanian government built expressly a pontoon bridge for the passing of the Bessarabian Germans... Bayonetted Rumanian soldiers guarded one end of the pontoon bridge and bayonetted Russian soldiers stood at the other end. Between them in the middle of the bridge were two unarmed SS-men guards. Each night the Rumanian soldiers cautiously took the pontoon bridge apart." 1/

Danubian ship-lines placed twenty-eight steamers at the disposal of the evacuees. Of a total of 88,478 persons, some 20,044 (23 percent) embarked at Chilia; 39,905 (45 percent) at Reni; and 28,523 (32 percent) at Galatz. 2/

Galatz was made the central assembling and departure station for the long and difficult road of repatriation. Motor loads of emigrants from Chilia and Reni arrived in Galatz each day. Several weeks before the beginning of the evacuation, uniformed Germans arrived in Galatz with five hundred trucks, and converted the former military airfield into a huge camp. 3/ A tremendous central barrack was fitted with beds for from five to six thousand persons; other barracks housed from nine to ten thousand persons. 4/ According to the description of the Countess Waldeck: 5/

"These hangars were comfortably arranged with straw-covered bunks and blankets and had names - they were called 'Flanders House', 'Dunkirk House' - reminiscent of victories, and also 'Stuttgart House' and 'Schwarzwald House' after the refugees' erstwhile Fatherland."

In a cable from Galatz on 28 September the New York Times correspondent wrote:

"One meets uniformed Germans at every turn; the streets are jammed with motorcycles and automobiles bearing the Nazi emblem... It is said 1,500 German officials are directing the mass transfer."

All sanitary, hygienic, and police measures necessary for the well-being of this enormous camp had been taken. A general hospital, a maternity hospital, as well as one for contagious diseases had been provided; at the Galatz railway

---

1/ Waldeck, Countess R.G. Athene Palace, New York, 1942, pp. 302-303.

2/ Thoss, Alfred. "Das grosse Werk der Umsiedlung." Volk und Reich, 1941, No. I, p. 64.

3/ The New York Times, 29 September 1940.

4/ Nation und Staat, October 1940, p. 33

5/ Waldeck, Countess, R.G. Athene Palace, New York, 1942, pp. 305-306.

station a hospital train stood waiting; in the harbor a hospital ship was anchored; and a motorized hospital column was slowly proceeding via Hungary. 1/ "Large trucks brought foodstuffs which came from all parts of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, so as not so deplete the country of Galatz of its supplies. Food was good and rich, taking account of the way the Bessarabian Germans were used to eating." 2/ The repatriates did not remain in the Galatz camp for long. The evacuation started on 23 September and two days later, the first contingent of 1,300 Germans left the port of Galatz on a Danube steamer bound for Belgrade. 3/

Yugoslavia was the second halting place. Here as in Galatz, very thorough preparations had been made for the reception, medical care, and further journey of the repatriates. The German minority of Yugoslavia numbering some 550,000 was under very strong Nazi influence, received financial help from the Reich and supported the Reich's policies.

As early as 21 August, one month before the evacuation from Bessarabia itself, an order issued by the leader of the German minority in Yugoslavia announced that hundreds of thousands of Germans who were to be repatriated from Bessarabia would spend an indefinite time in camps to be established by the Germans of Yugoslavia. 4/ A month later the Belgrade correspondent of the New York Times cabled that "about 300 laborers worked through today finishing the new German camp at Zemlin, across the Sava River from Belgrade, which has been established for a capacity of 12,000 persons." A second smaller camp of the same kind was erected in Prahovo.

The building of these transit camps and the voluntary self-mobilization for this purpose of a group of Yugoslav citizens of German origin, obviously had the consent and approval of the highest government authorities in Yugoslavia. In a sense these transit camps constituted a kind of temporary "state within a state." Only their external protection was entrusted to special units of the Yugoslav police. 5/ Youthful Yugoslavs wearing brassards of the German Labor Corps stood guard at the gates. 6/ The special permits required for entrance into the camps were issued by the German repatriation authorities and not by the Yugoslavs. 7/

The first convoy of about 1,300 repatriates arrived in Zemlin on 27 September. According to Dr. Ruth Hildebrand who watched the unloading of this first transport, "the disembarkation was carried out with exemplary order. In half

---

1/ Nation und Staat, October 1940, p. 33

2/ Waldeck, Countess, R.G. Athene Palace, New York, 1942, pp. 306,307.

3/ The New York Times, 29 September 1940.

4/ The New York Times, 22 August 1940.

5/ The New York Times, 26 September 1940.

6/ The New York Times, 15 September 1940.

7/ The New York Times, 20 October 1940.

(31059)

an hour, the ship was emptied and could again return to Galatz to carry a new precious load of peasants up to the Danube." 1/ Further transports arrived at regular intervals. Ordinarily the repatriates did not stay in the Zemlin and Prahovo camps more than two days. The next stopping place was Hungary.

Despite the then formal neutrality of Hungary, its exceptionally friendly relations with Germany proved to be very useful. As early as 4 September, the official Hungarian news agency announced that Germany was sending relief trains to assist in the evacuation of the German minority from Bessarabia. 2/ This announcement precipitated reports in both the neutral and Allied press that German troops were being transferred to the East, through Hungarian territory. These rumors were denied by the Hungarian Government in an official announcement of 7 September, which explained that permission to traverse Hungary had been granted to Nazi labor detachments and to Storm Troops, in order to facilitate the evacuation of the German minority from the Bessarabian frontier. 3/

The evacuation of the 42,441 Germans of Northern Bukovina presented quite a different transportation problem. Northern Bukovina, although it also had no common frontier with the Reich, was separated from the annexed Polish regions only by a comparatively narrow strip of Soviet Eastern Galicia, which could be crossed by railway in a very short time.

According to a statement made by Thoss, after the evacuation had been carried out, the route of the Bukovinians was as follows: 4/

"After the incorporation of the Northern part of Bukovina in the Soviet Union, the Germans who inhabited this territory got into the Reich by train in September and October mainly from Czernowitz via Przemysl."

The official Wirtschaft und Statistik also confirms the fact that the itineraries of the Bessarabian and Bukovinian repatriates were different. In speaking of the preliminary statistical survey of emigrants from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, it stated that "only 93,500 Bessarabians were examined during the transportation by ship on the lower and central Danube"; 5/ the 42,000 repatriates from Northern Bukovina were questioned in Cracow, and in Sanok in Western Galicia. As stated above, the evacuation from Northern Bukovina had been carried out entirely by railway; no trucks were used. 6/ Of course this meant that the Bukovinian Germans

---

1/ Hildebrand, Dr. Ruth. "Rueckwanderer Frauen," Das Reich, 25 October 1940.

2/ The New York Times, 5 September 1940.

3/ The New York Times, 8 September 1940.

4/ "Das grosse Werk der Umsiedlung." Volk und Reich, 1941, No. I, p. 65.

5/ Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 7, p. 150.

6/ Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik, March 1941.

(31059)

were unable to take most of their livestock, which on the eve of the evacuation was considerable (14,800 heads of horses and horned cattle, 3,200 sheep and 15,700 pigs), with them. 1/

9. Evacuation from Rumanian Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobrudja. On 9 October 1940, about a month after the inclusions of the German-Soviet evacuation agreement, a mixed German-Rumanian Commission met in Bucharest to discuss the removal of German minorities from Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobrudja. On 22 October an agreement was signed by the representatives of the Reich and of the Antonescu Government. 2/

When on 8 October the Bukarester Tageblatt, mouthpiece of the German Legation in Bucharest, announced that the German residents of North Dobrudja and South Bukovina were to be evacuated, the New York Times correspondent in Rumania pointed out that "no explanation was given for the removal of the Germans from provinces that are still a part of Rumania." 3/ And it was, indeed, very difficult to find an explanation for the immediate evacuation of the German minority groups of these two provinces. Particularly as at that time, the German minority in Rumania not only enjoyed equality, but actually held a privileged position and had no reason to be apprehensive of the future. In The Attack from Within, F. Elwin Jones wrote that even before the outbreak of the war, directly after the conclusion of the German-Rumanian treaty of 23 March 1939 "the German minority newspapers began to write a little as if they had annexed the Rumanians, not at all as if they were still the subjects of Rumania." 4/ The German military successes made the German minority of Rumania even bolder. On 18 August 1940 the Volksgruppenleiter of the Germans of Banat, Dr. Wolfram Brueckner, declared:

"The time of a mere tolerance has passed for us. One cannot seek support and protection of the German Reich, as the states of the South-East do, and simultaneously withhold the rights of the German folk-group... We shall not tolerate such proceedings. We, the Germans, are an indissoluble community in the entire world, thanks to our great Fuehrer. 5/

On 21 November 1940 the official Rumanian newspaper, Monitorul Oficial published a decree which made the "German folk-group in Rumania a legal person according to public law" with the right to frame, in agreement with the Government, "the laws concerning its own particular life and aiming at the preservation and strengthening of the German folk-group." At the same time, the Ministry of Economics assured the Germans that "Rumanian citizens of German nationality will be placed

---

1/ "Die deutschen Volksgruppen der neuen Rueckfuehrung in ihrem bauerlichen Bestand." Neues Bauerntum, August 1940, p. 282.

2/ Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik, November 1940, p. 561.

3/ The New York Times, 9 October 1940.

4/ Jones, F. Elwin. The Attack from Within, London, 1939, pp. 113-114.

5/ Nation und Staat, October 1940, p. 32.

on the same footing as the racial Rumanians with regard to rules and laws governing the Rumanian manpower in industry." 1/

Nevertheless, the Reich decided to evacuate the German population of South Bukovina and North Dobrudja. With regard to Southern Bukovina, a kind of explanation may be found in an article by Dr. Wilhelm Arz in Nation und Staat of October 1940. Dr. Arz stated that the incorporation of the northern part of Bukovina by the Soviet Union had resulted in the complete isolation of the German minority in Southern Bukovina. Thus, "the solution upon which the Fuehrer decided for the Germans of Bukovina in connection with the new organization of Southeastern Europe must be considered as a liberation from the fruitless struggling and striving which would in the final analysis have little chance for an enduring success."

The Germans of Dobrudja comprised the only German group to manifest a desire for mass emigration even before the inauguration of the Reich's repatriation policy. Originating mainly from Bessarabia, they had emigrated to Dobrudja in the period from 1830-40. About three quarters of the Dobrudja Germans were peasants, owning a total of 67,283 acres. 2/ However, as their birth rate was exceptionally high, the new German peasant generation found itself in desperate straits. Under the Rumanian law only racial Rumanians could legally buy land in Dobrudja. Thus other ethnic groups, including the Germans, were deprived of the possibility of enlarging their holdings. These factors naturally fostered emigration. Nation und Staat reported that an "emigration fever" raged among the Dobrudja Germans as early as the first half of 1938. A plan for a mass exodus to the Sudeten area, which was at that time a Czechoslovak province, gained much popularity among the Dobrudja German minority, as did other "adventurous projects." 3/ Leaders of the German minority in Rumania at first took energetic steps to put a stop to this emigration trend. After Hitler's Reichstag speech of 6 October 1939, this trend was revived once again. According to the New York Times Bucharest correspondent about ten thousand Germans from Dobrudja signified their intention to emigrate to Germany. 4/ However, at that time this intention did not correspond to the views of the Reich, and the Dobrudja Germans were forced to wait till the autumn of 1940.

The Craiova treaty of 7 September 1940 between Rumania and Bulgaria ceded South Dobrudja (where there were practically no German settlers) to Bulgaria, while the northern part of the province remained with Rumania. This partition of Dobrudja provided a motive for the evacuation of the Dobrudja Germans. line with its repatriation policy, the Reich invited the Dobrudja Germans to "return home." The 14,500 Dobrudja Germans voted unanimously to be transferred to Greater Germany.

1/ Nation und Staat, December 1940, p. 97.

2/ Neues Bauerntum, December 1940, pp. 421-434.

3/ "Auswanderungsfieber unter den Dobrudjadeutschen." Nation und Staat, May 1939, p. 539.

4/ The New York Times, 26 November 1939.

(31059)

The organization of the transfer was entrusted to an Umsiedlungskommando under SS-Oberfuehrer Sickmeyer. It took place during November and December 1940. Some 52,250 of the evacuees were from South Bukovina and 14,500 from North Dobrudja. The evacuees again had a choice of travelling by railroad or by wagon. The railway route from Bukovina was via Rumania and Hungary. The Dobrudja evacuees were quartered for a time in the transit camps established at Semlin and Prahovo, in Yugoslavia, thence to Germany via Hungary in special trains provided by the Reich. Evacuees leaving by train were only permitted to take with them their belongings "within the limits of the transport capacity of the Rumanian railroad network." Therefore many resettlers preferred to travel by cart or wagon, as there were no such restrictions. The last Germans left Dobrudja on 4 December 1940. 1/

10. Number, Age, and Occupational Distribution of the Evacuated Germans. The following table indicates the area of origin of the German minority groups evacuated from Rumania and the number of persons in each group:(a)

Area of Origin	Number of people evacuated
Bessarabia	93,548
North Bukovina	44,371
South Bukovina	55,250
Dobrudja	14,500
Old Rumania (Germans originating from the above mentioned four transfer areas but residing in the Old Kingdom)	7,000
Total	214,669

(a) Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 7. Thoss, Alfred. "Das Grosse Werk der Umsiedlung," Volk und Reich, January 1941, p. 65. Thoss, Alfred. "Die Umsiedlung der Volksdeutschen aus Bessarabien, der Bukovina und der Dobrudscha," Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik, March 1941.

The German repatriates from Bessarabia, Northern and Southern Bukovina, and Dobrudja differed greatly as to age classes and economic structure. From the point of view of colonization, the peasants of Bessarabia and Dobrudja were of much greater value to the Reich than the more industrialized Bukovina Germans.

The following table indicates the age and occupational distribution of the evacuated German minority groups:

1/ Thoss, Alfred. "Die Umsiedlung der Volksdeutschen aus Bessarabien, der Bukovina und der Dobrudscha." Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik, March 1941.

Table 1. AGE AND OCCUPATION OF THE EVACUATED GERMAN MINORITY GROUPS

Area of Origin	Age Distribution in Percentage (by Age)			Percentage by Occupation				
	below 14	14-65	over 65	Agriculture and Forestry	Handicrafts and Industry	Trade and Communications	Liberal Professions	Domestic Service
Bessarabia	31.7	64.7	3.6	81.7	12.9	2.2	1.8	1.3
North Bukovina	24.3	71.0	4.7	30.7	48.4	8.8	11.0	1.8
South Bukovina	21.7	67.5	4.8	43.7	46.2	3.7	3.5	2.5
Dobrudja	37.1	60.2	2.7	79,9	14.2	2.7	1.2	1.8

Source: "Altersaufbau und Berufsgliederung der Umsiedler aus dem Nord- und Suedbuchenland, Bessarabien und der Dobrudscha." Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 7, pp. 150-152

The following table illustrates the comparative composition of the liberal professions among the Germans of Bessarabia and Bukovina:

Profession	Number in Bessarabia	Number in Northern Bukovina
Law	33	154
Medicine and Dentistry	39	39
Teaching	399	578
Clergy	31	156
Total	502	927

All in all, however, the Reich, by repatriating these four differentiated groups received a well-balanced mass of 207,000 persons. The peasants of Bessarabia and Dobrudja, plus the craftsmen, industrial workers, and the intelligentsia of Bukovina were excellent material for the colonization of the incorporated former Polish provinces.

11. Fate of the Repatriated Germans. There is scant data available on the fate of the Germans repatriated from Bessarabia, Northern and Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobrudja, after their return to the Reich. A cable of 28 September to the New York Times from its correspondent in Galatz stated that "a large number of the Bessarabian emigrants will spend the winter in Southern Austria and be resettled in the spring /1941/." All indications are that the majority of the repatriates did spend the winter of 1940-41 in Southern Austria. 1/ Only the repatriates from Northern Bukovina who had followed an entirely different route (Czernowitz-Przemysl-Cracow) were quartered in camps in adjacent Silesia. 2/

The majority of the repatriated Germans spent many months in assembling camps. Only a part of the repatriates from Bessarabia and Bukovina were settled in the annexed former Polish provinces by the end of 1940. In an article entitled "Bauernland im Osten" Dr. Carl Hartwich wrote that "about 30,000 Germans from Bessarabia and Bukovina came to the new eastern provinces before the end of 1940." 3/ In the middle of March 1941, 48,000 Bukovina Germans were still in the transit camps of Silesia. 4/ According to the Ostdeutscher Beobachter, the official organ of the German authorities

---

1/ The New York Times, 29 September 1940.

2/ Suedostdeutsche Landpost, Hermannstadt, 16 March 1941.

3/ Das Reich, January 1941, p. 14.

4/ Suedostdeutsche Landpost, 16 March 1941.

in the incorporated Polish provinces, of 11 January 1942, by the end of 1941, 10,038 repatriates from Bukovina and 29,211 from Bessarabia had been settled in the Warthegau. The Krakauer Zeitung of 20 February 1942 announced that most of the Germans from Bukovina and Bessarabia had been resettled in the Gau Danzig-West Prussia. The Danziger Vorposten of 16 October 1943 reported that 8,642 families (some 43,000 persons) from Bessarabia were installed in this Gau. Reporting on the year 1941, the Deutsche Treuhand-Umsiedlungsgesellschaft wrote that "the settlement of the repatriates from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina at least will be finished in Spring of 1942, whilst the colonization of repatriates from Southern Bukovina will be completed by the end of 1942." 1/ There are no indications as to what extent this has been fulfilled.

According to the Ostdeutscher Beobachter of 4 January 1942, the Germans from Bessarabia and Bukovina, who arrived last, had a difficult time, as all the best farms and jobs had been taken by those who had arrived earlier or were reserved for front line soldiers.

Official and semi-official Czech sources have systematically asserted that Volksdeutsche evacuated from Bessarabia and Bukovina have been resettled not only in the incorporated Polish western provinces, but also in the German-controlled Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, and in the German-annexed Sudetengau. 2/

However, the silence on this subject of the usually voluble German sources, as well as the lack of accurate data on the part of the Czech sources concerning any actual settlement of Bessarabian and Bukovinian Germans on Czech territory, indicate that there has been no large-scale agricultural colonization of the Czech areas by "repatriated" Germans from abroad.

It is possible that the Czech reports refer to the many assembling camps established in the incorporated Czech areas as temporary quarters for the German repatriates. There is no doubt that tens of thousands of the Germans from Bessarabia and Bukovina were stationed in these camps, while awaiting resettlement; a considerable number lived in them for many months. But there is an essential difference between residing in camps -- even for a protracted stay -- and actual colonization.

A similar misunderstanding seems to have occurred concerning the alleged settlement of Bessarabian Germans in Alsace and Lorraine, along the Maginot line. Jacques Lorraine in La France Allemande wrote: 3/

1/ Frankfurter Zeitung, 4 April 1942.

2/ News Flashes from Czechoslovakia, No. 60, 6 December 1940 and No. 62, 30 December 1940. Erdely, Eugene V. Germany's First European Protectorate. London, 1941, p. 239. "Germanization in Czechoslovakia and Poland," News Flashes from Czechoslovakia, No. 95, 25 August 1941.

3/ Lorraine, Jacques. La France Allemande, Norton, Mass. 1942, pp. 205-206.

(31059)

"As early as February 20, 1941 the newspapers announced their coming /the Bessarabian Germans/ adding that they would be resettled in the Maginot line area; great preparations were made at that time to receive them.... Huge barracks were erected to provide temporary lodgings for these repatriates until they would be settled in the evacuated villages of Alsace-Lorraine.... On March 10, 1941 the arrival of a new group of Bessarabian Germans was announced in Karlsruhe, from where these emigrants were sent to the two temporary camps of Erlebad and Neusatzeck, awaiting their final settlement in the Bade territory and in certain regions of Alsace adjacent to the Maginot line."

Similar indications are found in other French sources. 1/ But there is no data on any real colonization of Bessarabian Germans in the Alsace-Lorraine area. Apparently their stay in these regions was also a temporary one.

Yugoslav sources speak of the colonization of Bessarabian Germans in the German-annexed northwestern part of Yugoslavia. 2/ This is the area from which some tens of thousands of Slovenes were removed to Old Serbia, or sent to the Reich for forced labor.

On 25 November 1942 the Tagespost (Graz) reported that Volksdeutsche from Southern Bukovina were being settled in the district of Ptuj, in Lower Styria. Later, on 22 January 1943 the Koelnische Zeitung mentioned that Germans evacuated from Bessarabia and Bukovina had been settled in Lower Styria. There is no precise data as to their number (which probably was not very large) or the places where they were settled.

A part of the Bessarabian Germans who were not considered sufficiently national-minded to be trusted in the recently incorporated territories, where they would be in contact with an overwhelming non-German majority, were settled in Central Germany. In an article entitled "Bauer Muthall kehrt heim" in the Frankfurter Zeitung of 6 March 1941, it was stated that "not all Bessarabian Germans are sent to the East. Some of them remain in the Reich: their Germanism has been so watered down in the course of centuries that they are unfit to become colonists in these new parts of Germany."

Thus, only fragments of the two hundred thousand Germans evacuated from Bessarabia and North and South Bukovina were resettled in the various other parts of the German-conquered area. The majority have either already been settled or are destined for new homes in the incorporated Polish provinces. Small groups of repatriates are not being settled in the General Government (District of Zamoscie and Lublin). 3/

1/ Debre, M. L'Alsace-Lorraine depuis l'Armistice. March 1942. Bulletin Publie par Alsace et Lorraine Libres, London, March 1942.

2/ Furlan, Prof. Boris. "Fighting Yugoslavia. The struggle of Slovenes." Yugoslav Information Center, New York, 1942, p. 19.

3/ Polish Telegraphic Agency (PAT). Bulletin of 12 August 1943. Parrot Cable, April 1943.

(31059)

When Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were retaken from Soviet Russia by the Axis Armies, and reincorporated into Rumania in July 1941, the question of a return of the evacuated Germans to these provinces was not raised by either side. Their departure was considered as final, but the problem of real property, left behind by the German evacuees in 1940, did arise. According to the German-controlled Novo Vreme (Belgrade) of 1 November 1941, this property amounted to 1,250,000 acres. From an article published in the Bukarester Tageblatt of 17 October 1941, it appears that the Rumanian authorities had some difficulty in dispelling "odd notions held by many Rumanians" that property thus acquired by the state should be distributed gratuitously, just as property expropriated from the Jews.

12. German Folk-Groups left behind in Rumania. Only a part of the Germans who lived in what was left of Rumania after it had been forced to cede a great part of its territory to Soviet Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, were invited to return to the Reich. The 188,643 Germans living in Southern Transylvania as well as the 101,056 in Gau Bergland and the 237,366 in the Banat, in the regions retained by Rumania, were asked to stay. 1/

Herman Jekeli, who was placed in charge of the evacuation by the German folk-group in Rumania, published an appeal, in the Bukarester Tageblatt of 6 November 1940, to the Germans in South Bukovina and North Dobrudja. In it he expressed his firm belief that, if these German groups had been destined by the Fuehrer to stay in Rumania, they would have fulfilled their duty faithfully. They were, however, "ordered by our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler to go to the Reich.... This appeal of the Fuehrer will be joyfully answered by every German in Bukovina and Dobrudja." He stated further:

"Your are going home into the Reich. We Germans in the Old Rumania, in the Banat and Transylvania remain here. You in the Reich and we here will fulfill our duty as Germans in a way in which Germans alone are able to do so. You as resettlers in the German East and we as an advanced folk-group in Rumania."

This indicates why the majority of the Germans in Rumania were left behind. The Reich evidently considered the strengthening of the German outposts in Southeastern Europe of much greater importance than the total repatriation of the Volksdeutsche of Rumania to the German-incorporated eastern European areas. Bernard Newman in The New Europe expressed the well founded belief that it was "Hitler's deliberate policy... to leave a large German population in the rump Rumania to justify a subsequent claim as German territory." 2/ He also recalled the fact that at one period it had been suggested that a portion of Transylvania be carved out to form a new German state. All

---

1/ These figures are based on the census of Germans in Rumania taken on 3 November 1940. The number of Germans in the Old Kingdom was given as 19,801. Source: Die Deutschen Siedlungen in Rumaenien nach der Bestandaufnahme vom 3 November 1940. Hermannstadt 1941.

2/ Newman, Bernard. The New Europe, New York, 1943, pp. 282, 462-463.

(31059)

the German settlers in the adjoining districts were to be resettled within the borders of the new German state. Donaustaat had already been chosen as its name. According to Fueggetlenseg (Budapest) this project was much discussed in the fall of 1942 at a meeting of the Hungarian Parliamentary Party. The Government was asked for an explanation of the rumors concerning a "second German state" which was to include Hungarian territory. Bela Lucacz, Minister without portfolio and Chairman of the Party, in his reply on behalf of the Government, was unable to give any satisfactory explanation. 1/

1/ Tigram, J.A. "A Second German State." The Central European Observer, 16 October 1942, p. 334.

(31059)

B. Evacuation of Bulgarians from Northern Dobrudja

1. Evacuation of 1940. Bulgaria's claims on Dobrudja date back to 1913, when as a result of the second Balkan war, the southern part of this province was lost to her. Bulgaria never relinquished these claims, but for the first months of the present war, agreed to postpone the issue, so as to prevent the spread of hostilities to the Balkans. Russia's annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, however, changed Bulgaria's attitude and she immediately presented her demands. After long negotiations, on 7 September 1940, in Craiova, a Bulgarian-Rumanian treaty was concluded. 1/ It provided for the cession of South Dobrudja (an area of 2,982 square miles with a population of 378,344) to Bulgaria and for a compulsory exchange of populations. The Bulgarians of the Northern Dobrudja districts of Tulcea and Constanza were to be transferred to Bulgaria and the Rumanians of the Southern Dobrudja districts of Durostor and Caliacra were to be sent to Rumania. The transfer was to be effected within three months.

The exchange of populations began on 7 November 1940, and was completed within the prescribed period, on 14 December 1940. During the transfer operations there arose a series of conflicts between the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments as to the number of persons in each country subject to evacuation. Oddly enough, each government was anxious to receive the minimum of blood brethren rather than the maximum. The German Suedost-Economist (Budapest) of 28 February 1941, which voiced the official Bulgarian point of view, complained that while at Craiova the Rumanian authorities had spoken of 55,000 Bulgarians to be evacuated from Northern Bulgaria, they later presented a list of 74,451 persons subject to evacuation. The Bulgarian authorities objected, claiming that among this number were many Greeks, Russians and members of other ethnic groups, who were not entitled to resettlement in Bulgarian Southern Dobrudja. After a careful recount, it was ascertained that there were 66,800 Bulgarians in Rumanian Dobrudja. This figure still considerably exceeded the one mentioned by the Rumanian Government at Craiova, and the Bulgarian Government at first refused to admit more than the original number. However, according to the Suedost-Economist, "in order to facilitate the negotiations, it /the Bulgarian Government/ finally agreed to receive sixty thousand"; as to the remaining 6,800 admittedly Bulgarians, it proposed the conclusion of a new agreement. The Rumanian Government refused and, as stated by the above mentioned source, "the Bulgarian Government was forced to leave these 6,800 in Northern Dobrudja." (See p.44 on similar attitude of Rumanian Government).

A vehement conflict also arose with regard to the sixty thousand Bulgarians whom the Bulgarian Government had agreed to admit. The Bulgarian authorities asserted that by 14 December 1940, 60,500 Bulgarians had crossed the frontier, while the Rumanians claimed that their number was only 57,500.

1/ The full text of the treaty and of the subsequent agreement on the exchange of population was published in: Monatshefte fuer Auswaertige Politik, November 1940, pp. 802-804.

According to the Suedost-Economist, the Rumanian authorities resolved this conflict by forcibly ousting the Bulgarian population of two villages. The villagers were placed in waiting trains and were taken over the frontier, The Bulgarian Government finally decided to admit these three thousand additional evacuees.

The Suedost-Economist placed the number of Bulgarians who left Rumanian Northern Dobrudja under the terms of the Craiova treaty at 63,500. Wirtschaft und Statistik 1/ gave 62,056 as the figure, while Neues Bauerntum of February 1941 spoke of 65,000 evacuated Dobrudja Bulgarians. The latter figure was corroborated by Alfred Thoss in the March 1941 issue of Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik. However, in the same issue of this magazine, Iv. Bataklien stated that only 63,117 Bulgarians had emigrated from Northern Dobrudja and that some 35,000, mostly town's people, had remained behind, owing to the difficulties of evacuation. The evacuated peasants came in carts from 265 villages; a part of them was shipped from Constanza. They took with them 18,500 horses, 3,500 swine, 215,000 sheep, 12,500 horned cattle and 12,000 small cattle. Some 62,056 repatriated Bulgarians were resettled in Southern Dobrudja, in 12,000 houses left behind by the evacuated Rumanians (see p. 44), thus bringing the population of this province up to 319,552. 2/

2. Proposed Bulgarian-Rumanian Repatriation Scheme of 1943. After the population exchange of 1940, the Dobrudja problem was apparently considered as solved by both countries. However, other nationality differences between the two states remained unsettled. The numerous Rumanian colonies scattered throughout Bulgaria, and particularly in the Timok Valley and south of the Danube, near Vidin, still presented a problem. According to the latest Bulgarian figures the Rumanian minority numbers 75,065; Rumanian statistics claim about 130,000. 3/ To this number must be added the Rumanian minority of Greek Macedonia, recently annexed by Bulgaria. Thus the matter of the minority rights of the Rumanians in Bulgaria continued to be a sore spot. For Bulgaria's part, its press frequently voiced disapproval of the lot of Bulgarian groups in Bessarabia (30,000) and in the Rumanian Banat (15,000) as well as of the several thousand Bulgarians spread over the other Rumanian provinces. 4/

In an effort to finally settle these quarrels, the two countries signed an agreement on 1 April 1943 extending the Craiova principle of exchange of population to the entire territories of the two contracting parties. This time, the exchange was not to be compulsory, but was to be carried out on a voluntary basis. However, on 22 May, a week before the

---

1/ Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 8.

2/ Suedost-Echo, 1941, No. 6, 7 February 1941. Also: Wirtschaft und Statistik, Vol. XXI, 1941.

3/ Free Europe, 12 July 1940.

4/ Grenzbote (Bratislava), 21 October 1942 (report from Bucharest).

stipulated deadline for the submitting of repatriation requests, the official Deutsches Nachrichten Buero (DNB) reported from Bucharest in a dispatch for Europe:

"The Mixed Bulgarian-Rumanian Commission for the Exchange of Nationals has announced that the Governments of the two countries have abandoned the idea of voluntary resettlement of their respective nationals; applications will no longer be received."

The feeble official explanation for the abandonment of the repatriation scheme was carried by Transocean of 25 May. It stated:

"According to well-informed circles in Bucharest, the suspension is due to the fact that neighborly relations between Rumania and Bulgaria have become very cordial during the past few months and differences which might arise in connection with resettlement questions should therefore be avoided."

This would hardly explain such a sudden and radical change in policy. Indications are that serious differences actually had arisen, so that the plan was no longer feasible.

After the abandonment of this large repatriation scheme, only minor exchanges of population occurred. On 1 October 1943, both Transocean and DNB broadcasts announced that 155 Bulgarians from the Rumanian part of the Banat were returning to Bulgaria under the terms of the Treaty of Craiova. They were to be settled in the Eastern Bulgarian village of Berdarski.Geren, on land which formerly belonged to German settlers who had returned to the Reich. The next group of Bulgarians from the Banat was expected in the middle of October. Northern Bulgaria was designated as the area where they were to be settled. 1/ (See also report of Research & Analysis Branch, Number 1177, entitled: The Abandonment of the Bulgarian-Rumanian Repatriation Scheme).

C. Flight of Jews and Soviet-Minded Rumanians to Soviet Areas

Immediately after the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by the Soviet Armies in June 1940, thousands of Jews escaped from old Rumania into these provinces seeking refuge from persecution. A number of Soviet-minded Rumanians also fled to the Soviet-occupied area. On 3 July the Moscow newspaper Red Star announced that more than two thousand deserters from the Rumanian Army had arrived in Bessarabia.

The first indication of the number of persons involved in this flight was given by a Transocean broadcast of 13 October 1942 from Bucharest. It stated that the 14,454 Rumanian nationals, who had left their country to settle down in Bessarabia and Bukovina after these territories had been ceded to Soviet Russia, had been deprived of Rumanian citizenship. 2/

1/ Bukarester Tageblatt, 10 October 1943.

2/ The figure of "more than 150,000 persons" given by David J. Dalin in Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, New Haven, 1942, p. 239, is certainly highly exaggerated.

Furthermore, it pointed out that "a large number of them were Jews," and that many of them had left Bessarabia and Bukovina in July 1941 together with the retreating Soviet troops.

In January 1941, the pogrom which accompanied the armed revolt staged by Vice-Premier Horia Sima, precipitated a new flight of Rumanian Jews to the Soviet area. The Report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for 1940 and the First Five Months of 1941, places the number of these refugees at 72,000. This is, however, much too large a figure. The Krakauer Zeitung of 13 August 1942 referred to "thousands of Jews" who had escaped to Soviet-incorporated Bessarabia and Bukovina.

According to a Rumanian census of April 1941 some three hundred thousand Jews were left in rump Rumania.

Table 2. DISTRIBUTION OF JEWS IN THE RUMANIAN PROVINCES ACCORDING TO CENSUS OF 6 APRIL 1941

Province	Number of Jews	Percentage of the total number of Jews in Rumania	Percentage of the population of each province
Oltenia	2,310	0.8	0.1
Muntenia	103,108	34.1	2.1
Dobrudja	2,817	1.0	0.5
Moldavia	133,024	44.0	4.8
Bukovina	17,750	5.9	5.4
Transylvania	15,187	5.0	0.9
Banat	18,738	6.2	2.0
Maramuresh	9,079	3.0	1.4
Total	302,013	100	

Source: Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, p. 392.

When in June-July 1941 the Rumanian and German Armies reconquered Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, about one-third of the 330,000 Jews who inhabited these two provinces at the outbreak of the war, fled to Soviet Russia proper. The Institute of Jewish Affairs estimated the number of these Jewish refugees at one hundred thousand. According to a "prominent Rumanian politician" quoted by Aftontidningen of 15 March 1943, their number, on the basis of the "most detailed investigation" was 130,000.

As a result of this flight and the subsequent mass deportation to Transnistria, Bessarabia was completely cleared of Jews. According to the Donauzeitung, the last group of

Jews to be deported from Kishineff, left on 13 June 1942. In Bukovina, of 100,000 only 34,000 remained. A large Jewish ghetto was established in Czernowitz. 1/ An indirect indication of the actual number of Jewish refugees and deportees from these provinces can be found in the following official Rumanian figures on the toal of Jewish buildings and rural property expropriated by the National Committee for Rumanization (CNR), by 6 December 1942: Bessarabia - 38,000 Jewish buildings and 987,500 acres of land; Northern Bukovina - 22,000 buildings and 87,500 acres of rural property. 2/ The number of expropriated Jewish enterprises in these two provinces was 1,118. 3/

Universul frankly admitted that "owing to evacuations caused by the war," the population of Bukovina has decreased by 14 percent and that of Bessarabia by 13 percent. The newspaper stated further that "the town are left without the majority of their tradesmen, artisans and craftsmen." 4/

D. Deportation of Jews and Gypsies to Transnistria

1. Jews. The original Rumanian conception of Transnistria as a model Rumanian province (see p. 51) certainly precluded any settlement of Jews in this area. At the outbreak of the war, this area contained about three hundred thousand Jews, of which number some 55,000 were farmers. 5/ It would seem that about 60 to 70 percent of the Jewish population was evacuated or fled before the Axis Armies enveloped the territory. 6/ (Entering Tiraspol, the population of which had been predominantly Jewish, on 18 August 1941, General Antonescu found only 1,200 inhabitants out of the town's resident population of 21,700). 7/ Thus only about 100,000 to 120,000 remained behind. Instead of removing this Jewish element in order to convert Transnistria into a "model Rumanian province," Professor Alexianu, the Rumanian Governor of Transnistria, issued a decree on 11 August 1941, according to which any Jew leaving the place of residence assigned to him by the inspector of police was to be subject to execution as a spy. The Rumanian-controlled newspapers of the province reported many executions of Jews who had attempted to flee Transnistria. 8/

1/ The American Jewish Year Book for 1943, Philadelphia, 1943, pp. 326-328.

2/ Timpul, 28 July 1943.

3/ Porunca Vremii, 1 August 1943.

4/ Universul, 4 August 1943.

5/ "Cold Pogrom in Rumania." Jewish Affairs, No. 7, February 1942.

6/ See Research and Analysis Branch Number 1176, entitled: "Displacement of Jewish Population in German-occupied Soviet Territories."

7/ Bukarester Tageblatt, 19 August 1941.

8/ Hitler's Ten Year War on the Jews. Published by the Institute of Jewish Affairs, New York, 1943.

At first the Alexianu decree applied only to Soviet Jews under Rumanian occupation. In fulfillment of this decree, the entire local Jewish population of Transnistria was shifted to certain districts along the Dniester, while Odessa, the capital, was made judenrein by the end of 1942. 1/

On 11 November 1941, however, a new decree converted the entire province, with the exception of Odessa, into a gigantic penal colony, not only for the remaining Jewish population, but also for some two hundred thousand Jews from Rumania proper. 2/ By that time the local Jewish population of Transnistria had almost been tripled by some 185,000 Jewish deportees from Bessarabia, North Bukovina, and even from the Old Kingdom. 3/ The German-Rumanian military authorities ordered that all the remaining Jews of Bessarabia and 85 percent of the Bukovinian Jews were to be sent across the Dniester River. According to a confidential report of the government-controlled Jewish Central Office in Bucharest, received by the World Jewish Congress in New York, in April 1943, the deported Jews were quartered in some thirty localities. These localities each contained from as little as one Jew to four thousand, with the exception of Mohilev Podolsk, where 12,000 to 14,000 Jews were concentrated.

The following table indicates, on the basis of a document smuggled out of Rumania to a neutral country, the sections of Transnistria in which the majority of the deported Jews are located, as well as the number of Jews in each section: 4/

Mohilev region	40,000
Balta district	15,000
Yugastra district	5,000
Tulchin (vicinity of)	4,000
Berezovka district	3,000
Total	67,000

Representatives of the Jewish Central Office in Bucharest who were permitted to visit Transnistria last April brought back some additional details.

1/ Donauzeitung, 24 December 1942.

2/ Timpul, 28 November 1941, No. 1638.

3/ The Deutsche Zeitung in Norwegen of 22 November 1941 reported from Rumania that the police captured a gang who were helping Jews to escape from Bukovina and Bessarabia to Bucharest and other large central Rumanian towns in order to avoid deportation.

4/ The Jewish Standard, 9 April 1943.

The following table indicating the number of Jews in the various towns of Transnistria is based on their list: 1/

Town	Present Jewish Population
Mohilev	15,000 of which number 3,000 resided there before the war
Krasna	1,000 of which number 300 resided there before the war
Yaruga	3,274 of which number 1,000 resided there before the war
Copaigorod	2,200
Balta	4,000
Golta	7,000
Bershad	9,000
Zatishye	1,500
Popivki	1,400
Cusamite	400
Cazaziovka	300
Stanislavic	200
Katmazov	1,200
Total	46,474

Other centers of deported Jews are: Gaissin, Paciore, Kapusteana and Ladyjin. 2/ In October 1942 the Bucharest correspondent of the Neue Zuercher Zeitung wrote that as a result of the divergence of opinion in the Rumanian Cabinet with regard to the further treatment of Jews, the deportations to Transnistria were temporarily suspended. 3/ However, early in July 1943, it was reported that all Jews residing in the villages and small towns of Rumania proper who had been ordered to move into the district capitals and to report to the authorities on arrival were to be sent to Transnistria. 4/ From Bucharest itself, where at first Jews had not been molested, 1,200 Jews were on one occasion summoned to police headquarters and subsequently shipped to

---

1/ Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin, 14, 18, 24, and 27 July 1943.

2/ Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin, 9 July 1943. New York Post, 14 July 1943.

3/ Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 29 October 1942.

4/ Trend of Events, 21 July 1943.

Transnistria. "No one is sure that he will not share the same fate," stated a report published in July 1943 by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. 1/ On 1 July 1943, Premier Antonescu warned the Rumanian Jews that unless the tax of four billion lei imposed on 14 May would be completely paid by 15 August, all the Jews would be deported to Transnistria. The deadline was later extended to 31 December. 2/

Starvation and epidemics have taken a heavy toll among the interned Jews in Transnistria. Reliable reports state that of the 185,000 - 200,000 Jews sent to Transnistria since October 1941, only 60,000 to 75,000 are still alive. 3/ However, it is possible that this tremendous decrease in population was partly a result of the deportation of Jews from Transnistria to work on fortifications along the German-held Eastern front. The Krakauer Zeitung of 13 August 1942 hinted at this when it stated that the Jews deported to Transnistria "were housed in large ghettos until an opportunity arose for their removal further east." At this time the Rumanian Ministry of Interior issued a statement that Jews charged with evading labor service or carrying on sabotage would be deported to occupied parts of Soviet Russia (rather than to Transnistria proper). 4/ This was another proof that the plan to make of Transnistria a reservation for deported Rumanian Jews had been abandoned. These indications were later confirmed. Underground information published in the Jewish Standard (London) of 30 June 1943 stated:

"The Rumanians are now lending many of the deported Jews to the Nazi military authorities for forced labor in the German-administered /administrated/ part of the Ukraine. These Jews are grouped in special formations and sent to build roads under Nazi supervision in the devastated districts of the Ukraine.... The first transport included 3,500 Jews from Zhmerinka and 500 Jews from Mohilev Podolsk who were dispatched in units to various Nazi-occupied places near the front. 5/

Able-bodied Jews who have not been drafted by the Germans for forced labor were working in Transnistria proper in the forests, on local farms, on the building of roads and demolition of ruined houses, or in ghetto workshops and factories producing goods needed by the Rumanian Army. 6/ It was also reported that the Rumanian authorities had even begun to send small groups of skilled Jewish tailors, saddlers, and shoemakers to judenrein Odessa, to supply the needs of the Rumanian Army. 7/

1/ The Jewish Standard, 30 July 1943.

2/ Contemporary Jewish Record, October 1943, p. 519.

3/ Contemporary Jewish Record, June 1943.

4/ The Jewish Standard, 14 August 1942.

5/ The Jewish Standard, 30 July 1943.

6/ Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin, 22 and 25 July 1943.

7/ Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin, 14 July 1943.

(31059)

In February 1943 there were reports that the Rumanian Government had offered to release seventy thousand Transnistrian Jews and to cooperate in transferring them to any refuge selected by the United Nations. 1/ Inquiries in Washington and London have uncovered no evidence that such an offer was ever made in good faith.

2. Gypsies. Some 262,000 Gypsies were registered by the Rumanian census of 1930. They represent a difficult and complicated problem for the government. According to a Havas report of 15 October 1942, an unspecified number of Gypsies were sent to Transnistria where they were interned in concentration camps. Donauzeitung of 25 October 1942 stated that the Rumanian authorities were "experimenting in settling the Gypsies in the Eastern provinces."

E. Civilian Workers

There is no available data on the number of Rumanian workers employed in Germany. According to all indications, they are very few. In a table showing the origin of the 2,139,553 foreign workers in Germany as of 23 September 1941, Rumanians are not even listed. They are included in the total figure of 189,919 "others", whose countries of origin are not mentioned specifically. 2/ On 28 October 1941, the Deutsche Zeitung in Kroatien (Zagreb) reported from Bucharest that a German-Rumanian agreement had been concluded, according to which about ten thousand Rumanians of between sixteen and nineteen years of age, were to be sent to Germany, to be trained for skilled labor prior to employement in Rumanian industry. At the end of 1941, the Reichsarbeitsblatt of 5 January 1942 stated that 16,000 Rumanians of eighteen and nineteen years of age were to be sent into German industries as apprentices, for a period of three years. However, according to information received in November 1942, by the International Labor Office from the Board of Economic Warfare, only 4,500 of these 10,000 - 16,000 actually went to Germany.

As to the agricultural workers, their presence in the Reich has never been mentioned either by German or Rumanian sources.

It is noteworthy that of all the Balkan satellites of the Reich and the German-dominated countries, Rumania (and Hungary) have contributed the smallest number of workers to German manpower. While Croatia with her population of 6,663,000 has sent 200,000 workers to Germany, Serbia proper with a population of 3,500,000 has given 66,000, 3/ and Slovakia with only 2,654,000 inhabitants has contributed 100,000 Slovak workers (plus 18,000 Volksdeutsche of Slovakia), 4/ rump Rumania with a population (as of January 1942) of 16,805,388 5/ has been good for only a few thousand

---

1/ The New York Times, 12 February 1943.

2/ Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 34, Part 5, p. 610.

3/ See Research and Analysis Branch Number 1366 entitled: "Handbook of Yugoslav Populations Statistics."

4/ Gardista, 29 July 1943; Donauzeitung, 19 August 1943.

5/ Universul, 16 February 1942.

workers. In this regard Rumania is even second to Greece (3,456,000 inhabitants) from where 6,000 - 10,000 workers have gone to Germany. 1/

The explanation for the surprisingly insignificant number of Rumanian workers in Germany may be found in the following facts:

(a) Since June 1941, Rumania, participating in the war against Soviet Russia has sent twenty-two divisions to the front. By the autumn of 1943 her casualties were estimated at nearly five hundred thousand. 2/ Thus Rumanian manpower has been considerably decimated, and unemployment is practically non-existant in this country. As early as 1941 the official labor exchanges registered 86,781 men looking for work and 76,140 vacancies. The Bukarester Tageblatt of 13 December 1941, stated that in March 1941 there were 2,077 unemployed, in November there were only 167, and in December, there were no unemployed whatsoever.

(b) Rumania has never been a highly industrialized country. In 1942, of her population of 16,805,000, 13,302,000 lived in the country and only 3,503,000 in the urban areas. 3/ About three-fourths of the population are engaged in agriculture. Even in 1937, when Rumania had a population of 19,422,000, the number of industrial workers did not exceed 278,919. 4/ After Rumania's successive territorial losses, the number of workers decreased greatly, as many industrial areas were cut away.

Rumania's petroleum industry which in 1941 produced 5,460,000 metric tons, requires a great deal of manpower. Of this output only 1,821,600 metric tons were consumed by the country itself. Almost all the rest went to Germany. 5/ Thus the continued maximum output of the Ploesti oil-fields is of the greatest interest to the Reich, and Ploesti workers are too valuable on the spot, to be sent to Germany.

Since all of Rumania's industry is important to the war effort, there is no manpower available for work in the factories of Germany.

(c) The same applies to agricultural workers. Rumania is Southeastern Europe's leading wheat, barley, corn, beet sugar, sunflower, and soya bean producer, and Germany is her biggest customer. 6/

1/ See Research and Analysis Branch Number 1174, entitled: "Population Movements in Greece."

2/ Christian Science Monitor, 18 October 1943.

3/ Universul, 22 March 1942.

4/ The New International Year Book for 1942, p. 604.

5/ Ibid.

6/ Bukarester Tageblatt, 4 May 1943. Die Deutsche Stimme, June 1943.

(31059)

Nevertheless, there is an unascertained number of Rumanian workers in Greater Germany and in the German-occupied territories. In September 1942, a circular of the Reichswirtschaftsminister mentioned Rumanian workers "employed in the Reich, the General Government, and the newly occupied Eastern provinces." 1/ Radio Rumania on 29 May 1943 spoke of Rumanian workers on vacation in Rumania, who were to return to Germany by 31 May. In October 1943 the Suedost-Echo (Vienna) reported that negotiations with Rumania, for additional labor for German industry, were in progress. 2/

F. Repatriation of Magyars

In June 1941, after long negotiations with the Soviet authorities, 3,706 families from nine Hungarian villages in Northern Bukovina were evacuated by the Hungarian Government. These 15,593 so-called Szecklers were descendants of Hungarian peasants who had settled in that part of Bukovina in 1764.

This repatriated Hungarian minority was resettled in the Yugoslav province of Backa, which in 1941, after Yugoslavia's dismemberment, had been annexed by Hungary.

Another group of 1,631 Magyars (408 families), repatriated during the period from March to September 1942, from Rumanian Moldavia, were also resettled in Backa. 3/

G. Repatriation of Swedes

The Svdsvenska Dagbladet (Malmo) of 27 August 1943, reported that the evacuation of Swedes residing in Rumania was being prepared. The feeling of insecurity prevalent in the small Swedish colony, in view of the very strained relations between the German army and the Rumanian population, was given as the reason for the proposed evacuation. Considering that the future course of the war holds uncertainty regarding Rumania, the Swedes, the newspaper wrote, "are not prepared to remain in anxiety." There is no data on the number of persons to be involved in this repatriation.

H. Rumanian Volksdeutsche in the Waffen-SS

According to the leader of the German ethnical group in Rumania, Andreas Schmidt, more than 73,000 Volksdeutsche from Rumania have volunteered for the Waffen-SS during the current year and by 29 July had already left for the front. 4/ In an article published in the Bukarester Tageblatt of 5 September 1943, Schmidt stated that the 550,000 Germans now living in Rumania, had supplied more soldiers than the entire Volksgruppe of Rumania, with all its settlements, both before and after 1918, had supplied during the first World War.

1/ Donauzeitung, 1 April 1943.

2/ Quoted by Aftontidningen, 1 November 1943.

3/ Pester Lloyd, 6 January 1943. Confidential Report of the Budapest Correspondent of the International Labor Office.

4/ German Home Service Broadcast of 16 November 1943.

(30159)

As a rule, nationals of a state who join a foreign army lose their citizenship. The sixty thousand Volksdeutsche 1/ of Hungary who enlisted in the German Army were deprived of their Hungarian citizenship. However, according to a Rumanian citizenship law of 16 January 1939, Rumanian citizens who joined a foreign army, with the permission of the Government, would not be deprived of their citizenship. Addressing the eight hundred Waffen-SS volunteers in Bucharest, General Codreanu declared that they had joined the Waffen-SS on the basis of a Rumanian-German agreement, and could leave the country without losing their citizenship. 2/

I. Russian Emigrés Bound for the German Front

After the end of the civil war in Russia (1920-21), Rumania had given shelter to a considerable number of former officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers of the old Russian Czarist Army, and of the White Armies of Generals Denikin and Wrangel; many Russian and Ukrainian civil refugees, holders of Nansen passports, had also found refuge on Rumanian territory. On 1 September 1943, the Rumanian Central Recruiting Commission announced that, in accordance with the convention between the Rumanian Government and the Government of the Reich, persons falling under any of the above listed categories, as well as members of Russian and Ukrainian minorities residing on Rumanian territory, were now permitted to enlist in the German Army. 3/ As a matter of fact, the recruiting of persons of the above mentioned categories must have begun before this announcement. On 14 August 1943, the Bukarester Tageblatt already reported that "transports of Russian, Ukrainian and Cossack emigres in Rumania, who have joined the Russian Corps of the German Wehrmacht have been leaving Bucharest every Sunday."

There is no exact data available as to the number of these volunteers. It probably reached from three thousand to five thousand.

1/ Slovak Home Service Broadcast of 16 November 1943.

2/ Bukarester Tageblatt, 28 July 1943.

3/ Curentul (Bucharest), 1 September 1943.

III. MOVEMENT OF POPULATION INTO RUMANIA

A. Repatriation of Rumanians from Southern Dobrudja

The previously mentioned Treaty of Craiova provided that Rumanians living in the districts of Durostor and Caliacra in Southern Dobrudja which had been ceded to Bulgaria were to be evacuated by 14 December 1940 (see p. 32). According to Dr. Oberascher, many Rumanians of this area did not wait for the conclusion of the treaty, but left at the first word of the impending frontier revision. 1/ The official evacuation did not start until 7 November, but as early as the beginning of September, Dr. Oberascher himself saw numerous Rumanian refugee camps, with carts, horses, herds of cattle, flocks of sheep, fodder stocks and furniture loads, on the bank of the Danube between Turtucaia and Silistra. Many of these early emigrants were peasants who had been settled in Southern Dobrudja, after 1913 by the Rumanian Government, in order to Rumanianize the newly acquired province, and to strengthen the new frontier against Bulgaria. Among them were also some 23,000 Macedonian Vlachs, who had been expelled from Greek Macedonia in 1922; 2/ others had been brought from Moldavia and Valachia. There were also some ex-convicts, chosen to hold the dangerous reaches of this outpost of Rumania. According to Bernard Newman who had witnessed this settlement, the Dobrudja Bulgars "glared at these Rumanian settlers literally across the hearth. The tiny farms of the Bulgars were seized, and a half presented to an incoming Rumanian. The Bulgar must even house his enemy until he could build a dwelling for himself." 3/

Intense hatred of the Rumanian newcomers had accumulated during the twenty-seven years of Rumanian rule. Thus many of the Rumanians did not deem it advisable to wait for the day when the Bulgars would again be the rulers of the country.

Official Rumanian statistics gave 282,844 as the number of Rumanians in the ceded districts of Caliacra and Durostor. This figure later proved to be tremendously exaggerated. The number of Rumanians who actually left Southern Dobrudja in the course of the Bulgaro-Rumanian population exchange did not exceed 110,000. 4/ On the other hand the Rumanian Government, just as the Bulgarian Government, which had tried to admit a minimum of Bulgarians, was by no means eager to accept all the Rumanians from Southern Dobrudja. According to the previously quoted report of the Suedost-Economist (see p. 32), the Rumanian Government refused to receive six thousand Rumanians from the Tutracan district. After long and futile negotiations, the Bulgarian authorities on 11 December forcibly removed this group from their homes and sent them across the Danube to Rumania. The Rumanian authorities immediately sent them back to the Bulgarian bank of the river. 5/

1/ Oberascher, Dr. L. "Umsiedlung und Dissimilation." Wirtschaftsdienst, 3 January 1941

2/ Manuila, Dr. Sabin. Ethnographical Survey of the Population of Rumania, Bucharest, 1938, p. XXX.

3/ Newman, Bernard. The New Europe, p. 276.

4/ Oberascher, Dr. L. "Umsiedlung und Dissimilation." Wirtschaftsdienst, 3 January 1941.

5/ Suedost-Economist, 28 February 1941.

As has been stated, both countries seemed to consider the Dobrudja problem as solved. Charles Upson Clark spoke of a "voluntary" cession of Southern Dobrudja to the Sofia Government, comparing this action with the cession by Great Britain of the Ionian Isles to Greece a century ago. 1/ Accordingly, the Rumanian Government has made every effort to permanently settle the 110,000 repatriates from Southern Dobrudja on Rumanian territory, as quickly as possible.

A General Commissariat for Dobrudja entrusted with the resettlement of the evacuees from Southern Dobrudja was established by the Rumanian Government. 2/ Northern Dobrudja was selected as the main resettlement area. Here the 283,965 acres of arable land and 11,794 farms vacated by the 63,000 to 65,000 repatriated Bulgarians, were placed at the disposal of the General Commissariat. An additional 64,982 acres of land and 2,481 farms were made available by the emigration from this area of 14,500 Germans (see p. 24). However, the colonization plan provided that each family of resettlers be given a house and a farm of at least 25 acres. Thus out of the 22,980 evacuated families not more than some 13,500 families or (counting five persons per family), some 65,000 to 67,000 persons could be resettled in the Constanza and Tulcea districts of Northern Dobrudja. 3/ As the number of Rumanians repatriated from Southern Dobrudja reached 110,000, the land reserves of Northern Dobrudja proved insufficient for the settlement of all the Rumanian repatriates. Some 5,200 families were installed in Bessarabia and Bukovina (in villages evacuated by the German colonists in October-November 1940; (see p. 25), as well as in the districts of Timis and Torontal. 4/ Although the General Commissariat for Northern Dobrudja was dissolved in July 1943, 5/ some twenty thousand Dobrudja repatriates have still not been settled in permanent homes. These thousands of unsettled and dissatisfied persons constitute a difficult and complicated problem for the country. In August 1943 the Ministry of Finance granted a credit of twenty million lei for indemnities, to those repatriates who had abandoned their estates in Southern Dobrudja and had not been indemnified in kind. 6/ On 6 October 1943, Universul reported that the Association of Evacuees from Southern Dobrudja had appealed to the Minister of Rumanization, requesting the same treatment as had been extended to the refugees from Transylvania, who had been given buildings and enterprises confiscated from the Jews (see p. 48).

Since the abandonment of the proposed largd-scale Bulgarian-Rumanian repatriation scheme of 1943 (see p. 34), only small groups of Rumanians have been repatriated from

---

1/ Clark, Charles Upson. Racial Aspects of Rumania's Case, 1941, p. VII.

2/ Bukarester Tageblatt, 20 July 1943.

3/ DNB Broadcast for Europe of 8 September 1943. Donauzeitung, 28 May 1942.

4/ Transcontinent Press, 28 August 1943.

5/ Bukarester Tageblatt, 20 July 1943.

(31059)

Bulgaria. On 1 October 1943 DNB announced that about two hundred Rumanians would return to their homeland from an unidentified part of Bulgaria.

B. Rumanian Refugees from Northern Transylvania

The Russian seizure of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (see p. 9) also precipitated the solution of the over two decades old Rumanian-Hungarian conflict on Transylvania. The latter had under the terms of the Trianon Treaty of 1919 been detached from Hungary, and incorporated into Rumania. As the Rumanian territorial status quo had already been shattered by Soviet intervention, Hungary decided to make the most of the situation and get her share. She presented her claim on Transylvania and began to mass troops on the frontier.

Rumania sought German protection, but was advised to negotiate with Hungary. The conferences between the two countries began at Turnu Severin in August 1940. The Rumanian representatives fully realized that concessions were unavoidable and offered to make considerable territorial adjustments. In effect some half a million Magyars would have returned to Hungarian rule. 1/ The Rumanians suggested, however, that the new delimitation be based on a preliminary far-reaching population exchange between the two countries. The territorial sacrifices which Rumania was prepared to make were to be based on the results of this exchange and were to provide the necessary "living space" for the repatriates. The Rumanian delegation argued that "by an equitable rectification of the then existing frontier and an exchange of populations, a settlement could be reached that would in effect reduce to a minimum the number both of Hungarians in Rumania and of Rumanians in Hungary." 2/ Manolescu, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, proposed this scheme in a speech delivered in August 1940; 3/ it was reiterated by Prime Minister Ion Gigurtu several days later. 4/ The Hungarian delegates flatly refused to consider this proposal. They argued that the number of Magyars to be "exchanged" and resettled by far exceeded the number of Rumanians to be repatriated, and demanded the cession of the greater part of Transylvania (thirteen departments covering over 26,000 square miles). This would have meant that 2,200,000 Rumanians would become Hungarian subjects. 5/ The Hungarian delegation was willing to consider a population exchange only after the cession of this territory.

The dispute was referred to Axis arbitration. On 30 August 1940, in Vienna, von Ribbentrop and Count Ciano awarded the northern half of Transylvania (17,500 square miles) to Hungary.

1/ Newman, Bernard. The New Europe, p. 266.

2/ Clark, Charles Upson. Racial Aspects of Rumania's Case, 1941, p. 19.

3/ Weingaertner, Arnold. "Ende und Anfang in Rumaenien." Nation und Staat, October 1940

4/ Affaires Danubiennes, 1940, No. 8, p. 75.

5/ Newman, Bernard. The New Europe, p. 266.

According to a Rumanian estimate of 1940, based on a 1930 census and recent vital statistics, of the 2,370,000 population of this area, 1,304,903 were Rumanians and 978,074 were Magyars. 1/ The Rumanians complained that 978,000 Magyars had been returned to Hungary at the cost of 1,304,000 Rumanians. 2/

In connection with the transfer of territorial sovereignty, a voluntary population exchange was provided for. In Northern Transylvania, ceded to Hungary, Rumanians were allowed to opt within six months, for either Rumanian or Hungarian citizenship. Those opting for Rumania were to leave the Hungarian territory within the following year. The same applied, vice versa, to those choosing Hungarian citizenship in Southern Transylvania, which remained under Rumanian rule. In contrast to the Craiova agreement between Rumania and Bulgaria concerning Dobrudja (see p. 32), this exchange of population between Rumania and Hungary was not of a compulsory nature. The Rumanians in Northern Transylvania as well as the Magyars in Southern Transylvania were at liberty to remain, providing they accepted Hungarian and Rumanian citizenship respectively. If they were willing to accept, they simply refrained from opting and after six months automatically became Hungarian or Rumanian citizens, as the case might be. Thenceforth they lost the right of option. The entire question was one of individual choice and neither Government as such was involved in any way. Nor was neither Government under any obligation to organize the evacuation or to assist the emigrants on their arrival in the country of their choice.

As has been stated, neither the Hungarian nor the Rumanian Government was anxious to receive repatriates, both countries considering the results of the Vienna Award as only temporary.

The Magyars of Southern Transylvania did not make use of their right of option. There is no data whatsoever which would indicate any noticeable exodus of Hungarians from this area. The only two minor Hungarian groups, repatriated to Hungary from Rumania in 1941 and 1942, belonged to the sparse Hungarian population of Bukovina and Moldavia (see p. 42). It may be assumed that, with Hungary's claim for the return of the rest of Transylvania and the other provinces lost in 1919 (there were four hundred thousand Magyars left in Rumania), still pending, the Transylvanian Magyars on the Rumanian side of the frontier were advised by the Hungarian Government not to leave the disputed area.

Apparently the Rumanian Government handed down similar directives to the Rumanians in the Hungarian part of Transylvania. Rumania had in no way relinquished the hope of recovering the territory ceded under pressure of an unfavorable political situation. In the achievement of this end, her principal asset was the large Rumanian population in Northern Transylvania. Even according to Hungarian statistics, Rumanians constituted 43 percent of the inhabitants of this province. The Rumanian Government could hardly be expected to diminish the potential value of this asset by encouraging a mass emigration of Rumanians.

1/ Clark, Charles Upson. Racial Aspects of Rumania's Case, p. 18.

2/ The Hungarian census of 1941 showed only 1,100,352 Rumanian-speaking persons in the entire territory of Hungary (Uj Nemzedek, 12 August 1943). Rumanian sources contest the accuracy of Hungarian statistics.

As a matter of fact, in 1941, of the 1,370,000 Rumanians of this area, only 100,000 utilized their right of option and left Transylvania. In 1943, a Transocean broadcast of 29 April reported that according to the census of that year, there were 202,233 refugees from Northern Transylvania in Rumania. 1/ Thus less than 15 percent had left Hungarian-incorporated Transylvania. Over a half of these refugees (116,948) were men between the ages of twenty and forty, who in this way hoped to avoid being drafted into the Hungarian Army. Although it was reported that peasants constituted the largest group among the refugees, former Rumanian officials, politicians, and persons employed in the liberal professions were also largely represented. The latter elements had lost their jobs under the new Hungarian regime and saw no prospects for a better future. 2/ As representatives of the Rumanization policy, they were cordially hated by the local Hungarian population and thus had reason to fear vengeance.

There was no room in the densely populated Rumanian part of Transylvania (1,736,307 as of January 1942) for the resettlement of the two hundred thousand Rumanian refugees. 3/ The Magyars living in this territory had not emigrated, so that no vacated farms or jobs were available.

After the reconquest of Bessarabia in 1941, a New York Times dispatch from Bucharest had reported that one hundred thousand Transylvanian Rumanians were to be settled in this area. 4/ This project never materialized. Most of the Transylvanian refugees are still living on state support. A special governmental commission was set up to organize assistance for them. 5/ They were also given buildings and enterprises confiscated from the Jews. 6/ However, as has been indicated, the Rumanian Government prefers to maintain them in their present refugee status, which is much more compatible with its political ends. The majority of the refugees themselves still retain the hope of returning to Northern Transylvania, where they were the ruling class, and prefer a temporary refugee status to the permanent but very modest existence open to them in Rumania proper.

1/ Within this category are included the Northern Transylvanian Rumanians, who were already domiciled in what was to be rump Rumania, before the Vienna Award, but who had estates or family in the ceded territory (Bukarester Tageblatt, 21 January 1943). The number of "genuine" refugees is therefore lower.

2/ "After the Vienna Award the intellectual leaders of the Transylvanian Rumanians left Northern Transylvania of their own accord," stated the Magyar Nemzet of 4 July 1943. Charles Upson Clark in Racial Aspects of Rumania's Case, asserted that the Hungarian authorities had "with the utmost ruthlessness expelled the Rumanian intellectual elite."

3/ Universul, 16 February 1943.

4/ The New York Times, 20 August 1941.

5/ Havas, 21 November 1942.

6/ Universul, 6 October 1942.

C. Flight of Rumanians from Soviet-incorporated Bessarabia to Rumania Proper

In June 1940 some 35,000 to 40,000 Rumanians fled Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina before the oncoming Soviet Armies. 1/ On 30 June the Bucharest correspondent of the New York Times reported by telephone that "the pitiful exodus of Rumanians from the new Russian territory goes on day and night and so far eighty trains, crowded with weary people of all walks of life, have arrived in the Old Kingdom; along the roads a steady stream of automobiles, trucks and men and women on foot passes slowly west and south." Most of the refugees from Bukovina went to Transylvania and those from Bessarabia to the neighboring province of Moldavia. The Rumanian Government did its utmost to prevent them from reaching Bucharest. The refugees were mainly Rumanian officials, businessmen, or persons engaged in the liberal professions, who had come to Bessarabia and Bukovina after 1918, when these provinces were incorporated into Rumania; 2/ the indigenous peasant population of these provinces remained unaffected by this flight.

The exodus of certain Rumanian elements continued after the actual occupation of these provinces by the Soviets. On 20 July it was reported from Bucharest that on that day the first batch of 350 refugees to leave Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina since the Russian occupation, had reached Rumania, and that six hundred more were expected the following day. 3/ In December, it was reported that eight thousand Rumanian peasants from two villages on the Northern Bukovina frontier, dissatisfied with life under the Soviet regime, had attempted to cross the near-by border in order to settle in Rumania, but were prevented from doing so by the Soviet guards at the frontier. 4/

D. Evacuation from Rumanian Reconquered Bessarabia

In November of this year, with the rapid advance of the Soviet Armies on the South Ukraine front and the flight from Transnistria (see p. 53), the Rumanian Government has speeded the evacuation of Bessarabia. Important Rumanian state offices together with their personnel have been moved to Transylvania and located in the little town of Brasov. 5/ On 20 November, the New York Times reported that five hundred Bessarabian civilian refugees had already arrived in the Old Kingdom; a similar large-scale exodus had started in Moldavia. According to all indications, this figure is much too large, but travellers from Rumania arriving in Istanbul related that "streams of Rumanians settled on the broad mud flats of Bessarabia pour daily into Rumania proper, driving their cattle and carts filled with household goods before them." 6/

1/ Dalin, David J., in Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942, New Haven, 1942, p. 259, states that "within one week, about 200,000 refugees from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina crossed the border into Rumania." This figure is greatly exaggerated.

2/ The New York Times, 1 July 1940.

3/ The New York Times, 21 July 1940.

4/ The New York Times, 6 December 1940.

5/ Svenska Dagbladet, 10 November 1943.

6/ The New York Times, 2 December 1943.

E. The Alleged Repatriation of Rumanians to Transnistria

After the German-Rumanian forces had regained Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (July 1941), ceded to the Soviets in June 1940, Marshal Antonescu sent his troops across the Dniester River into the Southern Ukraine, although Rumania's account with Russia was ostensibly settled. The provinces of Podolia and Cherson were conquered quickly and Odessa which was assaulted on 13 August was occupied on the eighteenth of October.

According to a German-Rumanian pact signed at Tighina (Bessarabia) on 19 August 1941, 1/ a large sector of the Southern Ukraine, from Nikolaev on the Black Sea, along the Bug River via Vosnesensk-Konstantinovka-Gaivoron and Bar to Mohilev on the Dniester, was proclaimed the Rumanian province of Transnistria -- the land beyond the Dniester. 2/ This province covers an area of 16,000 square miles and contains a population of 2,236,226 inhabitants. 3/ Odessa was designated as its capital, but as it had been too heavily damaged, the relatively small town of Tiraspol was named the temporary capital. 4/ It was not until October 1942, that the Rumanian central administration was transferred to Odessa. 5/

No precise official description is available of the territory of Transnistria and of the national composition of its population. Rumanian sources, which seek to assert Rumania's historical and geographical rights to this area, 6/ are significantly vague on this score. Only an approximate picture of the territory and population of this province on the basis of scattered items in Rumanian and Russian sources, and on general knowledge of the area involved, is possible.

Transnistria's kernel is the former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic which was created in October 1924. The MSSR is situated in the western part of the Southern Ukraine on the left bank of the Dniester. In the north, it is bounded by the Vinnitsa region of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; in the east and south by the Odessa region. The territory of the MSSR is composed of parts of the Balta and Odessa districts of the Podolia region. Its area is 32,300 square miles; its population in 1933 was 615,500 (192 persons per square mile). Its population comprised 30.1 percent Moldavians, 48.5 percent Ukrainians, 8.5 percent Russians, 8.5 percent Jews; 4.4 percent belonged to other folk-groups. Over 10 percent of the population were urban dwellers, the most important towns being Tiraspol, Balta, Ananyow, Rybnitsa, and Kotovsk (formerly Birzula).

To this kernel the Rumanians added large parts of the adjacent Ukrainian territory, including the great seaport of Odessa which in 1939 had a population of 604,000, and was the capital of the vast and rich Odessa region, and the city of

---

1/ The Christian Science Monitor, 18 October 1943.

2/ Stockholm-Tidende, 16 May 1942.

3/ Bukarester Tageblatt, 20 August 1943.

4/ Aftonbladet, 4 November 1941.

5/ Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 15 October 1942.

6/ Curentul, 1 May 1943.

Mohilev on Dniester, situated in the Vinnitsa region of the USSR with a population of 22,000 as of 1935. The Vinnitsa region also contains the key railroad station of Zhmerinka, a town with over 20,000 inhabitants. Other towns in this Ukrainian territory are Bar with some 10,000 inhabitants, which, although only six kilometers from Zhmerinka, belongs to the Mohilev district, and Vosnesensk which is situated in the Nikolaev district on the left bank of the southern Bug River, and in 1926, had a population of 20,813. 1/

The Rumanian press has consistently claimed the predominantly Rumanian character of Transnistria. Porunca Vremii asserted that "there are more than one million Rumanians beyond the Dniester." 2/ Curentul spoke of "an absolute Rumanian majority" in the square formed by the towns of Soroca, Balta, Ananiev, and Tiraspol, while "on the remainder of the left bank of the Dniester, Rumanian villages were to be found to the depth of thirty to forty kilometers." 3/ This claim is, of course, unfounded. Even in the MSSR, established in order to create a Moldavian irredenta center, which could back the Soviet claims on Bessarabia, the Moldavian element constituted only 30.1 percent of the population. In other parts of Transnistria, especially in Odessa, it was quite insignificant. According to the Berlin correspondent of Svenska Dagbladet, only about 5 percent of the total population of Transnistria was of Rumanian origin. 4/ This is undoubtedly too small a figure, as the official Soviet statistics of 1926 counted 172,500 Moldavians in the MSSR alone, and some 107,000 more in other parts of the Ukraine. 5/ Nevertheless, Rumanians constituted only a small minority in Transnistria's total population. Donauzeitung of 20 October 1942 frankly acknowledged that the majority of Transnistria's population was Ukrainian.

Well aware of this situation, and in the hope of strengthening the Rumanian claims on Transnistria, Marshal Antonescu announced that Transnistria would be made into a model Rumanian settlement through large-scale Rumanian colonization. In October 1941 it was reported that Rumania claimed that some fifty thousand to eighty thousand Rumanians living in districts on the east bank of the Bug River would be repatriated. 6/ A special committee was appointed by the Antonescu Government, to be entrusted with the repatriation of persons of Rumanian stock, living beyond the Bug as well as in other parts of the Ukraine on the Dnieper River, in the Crimea and the Caucasus. The number of prospective repatriates was estimated as somewhere between thirty thousand and two hundred thousand. 7/

1/ Bolshava Sovietskaya Encyclopaedia, Vols. 4, 12, 25, 39.

2/ Porunca Vremii, 26 September 1943.

3/ Curentul, 9 September 1941.

4/ Svenska Dagbladet, 9 November 1941.

5/ Malaya Sovietskaya Encyclopaedia, Vol. 5, p. 308.

6/ Magyar Nemzet, 30 October 1942.

7/ Grenzbote, 21 October 1942. Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 23 October 1942.

By the end of 1942 a group of Rumanian statisticians who were sent to make a special census of the Rumanian population east of the Bug counted a total of 23,000 Moldavian families (some 115,000 persons). 1/ A large proportion of these were to be settled in Transnistria. This project fell through. Allied political circles believe that Antonescu "foresaw the probability that Rumania would not be able to keep Transnistria." 2/

There are indications that small groups of colonists of Rumanian origin have been transferred to Transnistria from Rumanian villages scattered over other parts of Axis-occupied Soviet Russia. Universul of 23 June 1943 mentions Rumanian peasants brought from Moldavanskaya in the Kuban region. It is noteworthy that, according to the same source, Marshal Antonescu "found a certain amount of discontent" among these transferees when he visited Transnistria. They "seemed to feel that their hopes have not been fulfilled, while a few of them showed discontent at having been uprooted." One of them even stated that they had been much happier under the Czar, than under the Marshal, as the Czar had been more generous. Another requested that they be granted a part of the land in the vicinity of the Bessarabian town of Cetatea Alba, which had belonged to repatriated German colonists. Curentul reported that the Marshal had "lost his temper" and replied that this land was reserved for the soldiers fighting at the front.

As a matter of fact, the limited influx of Rumanians into Transnistria consisted almost exclusively of officials, and military elements. The Soviet Izvestia of 14 October 1941 spoke of a "pack of Rumanian officials, gendarmes and landlords raging in the Rumanian occupied area," and made special mention of 4,600 requisition officers sent over from Old Rumania. In order both to attract and keep the Rumanian officialdom in Transnistria, the salaries of civil servants and government workers were increased by 50 percent. 3/

On the other hand, the question of transferring the indigenous German minority to the Reich or to the German-occupied territories as in the case of 93,000 Germans evacuated from neighboring Bessarabia (see p.), has never been raised. There are from 130,000 to 135,000 Volksdeutsche in Transnistria. They form almost 6 percent of the province's population and live in 229 towns and communes, some 120 of which, according to a German source, have a German majority, or are purely German. 4/

1/ Universul, 15 March 1943.

2/ The New York Times, 1 February 1943. The German Bukarester Tageblatt of 7 July 1943 quotes the Rumanian newspaper Informatia as stating: "We do not wish to acquire foreign soil, but have only temporarily occupied enemy territory in order to deprive the serpent of its fangs."

3/ Curentul, 18 April 1943. Novoye Slovo (Berlin), 30 May 1943.

4/ Donauzeitung, 12 and 20 December 1942.

According to Curentul of 20 August 1943, a Bulgarian delegation from the Rumanian-occupied Southern Ukraine arrived in Bucharest for the purpose of arranging for the repatriation to Bulgaria, of some twenty thousand Bulgarians living in this territory. Although negotiations were begun, there is no data to signify that any concrete steps in this direction have been taken to date.

F. Evacuation of Rumanians and Deported Jews from Transnistria

In October 1943, the relentless advance of the Soviet troops on the Dnieper front created intense anxiety in Bucharest, concerning the fate of Transnistria. On 12 October the Budapest correspondent of Svenska Dagbladet reported that the Rumanians were making serious preparations to evacuate this province. All Rumanian civil servants in Transnistria had been ordered to send their wives and children to Rumania, and many of them had already arrived in Rumania. They were accommodated in Bucharest, and in Transylvanian towns. The German Minister of Communications, Dorpmueller, had visited Odessa on 3 October to inspect the Transnistrian military transport system in connection with the impending evacuation. 1/ On 28 October a BBC broadcast in French announced that not only the families of Rumanian civil servants, but all Rumanians now living east of the Dniester had received orders to move into the interior of Rumania. The number of persons actually evacuated is not known. On 12 November a United Press dispatch reported the evacuation of "thousands of civilians from eastern areas threatened by the advancing Red Armies." 2/ "Fourteen trains leave Odessa daily for Rumania, carrying Rumanian civilians, archives and staple supplies." 3/

On 28 November Trend of Events announced that the Rumanian Government had ordered the repatriation of the remaining 75,000 Jews, who had been deported to Transnistria from various parts of Rumania in 1941. The local Jewish population of this area was not to be removed.

G. Polish Refugees in Rumania

After the collapse of Poland, in September 1939, parts of the Polish Army retreated to Rumania. The Polish soldiers were immediately interned. Many of them later found their way to France. A number of civilians, mainly politicians, officials, and Jews, also fled to Rumania. At the end of 1939, although many had already managed to leave the country, there were about 17,000 Polish civilian refugees in Rumania. 4/ In 1940-41 those who were able to do so continued to leave; other refugees were removed to Poland after Rumania joined the Axis. At the end of 1942 the Polish Information Center estimated the number

---

1/ Bukarester Tageblatt, 8 October 1943.

2/ The New York Times, 13 November 1943.

3/ The New York Times, 2 December 1943.

4/ The International Labor Office Yearbook, 1939-40, p. 220.

of Polish refugees in Rumania at four thousand. 1/ According to the Polish section of the London sub-committee for repatriation, of the Interallied Committee for Post-War Requirements, 2/ in September 1943, there were still thirty thousand Polish refugees in Rumania. This figure is in striking contradiction with all available data, and is without doubt greatly exaggerated.

1/ According to information received by the International Labor Office.

2/ Ministerstwo Pracy i Opieki Spolecznej. Biuletyn Informacyjny No. 4, London, 30 sierpnia 1943, p. 6.

Table 3. POPULATION DISPLACEMENT OF RUMANIA

Note: The following table disregards the changes in the territorial status of Bessarabia during the period of 1940-41.

Number	From	To	Date
93,548 Volksdeutsche	Soviet-incorporated Bessarabia	German-incorporated Polish provinces, and partly to the German-annexed Yugoslav province of Lower Styria, as well as Central Germany	October-November 1940
44,371 Volksdeutsche	Soviet-incorporated North-Bukovina	"	November 1940
55,250 Volksdeutsche	South Bukovina	"	November-December 1940
14,500 Volksdeutsche	Dobrudja	"	November 1940
7,000 Volksdeutsche	Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, residing in Old Rumania	"	Winter of 1940-1941
73,000 Volksdeutsche	Banat, Transylvania and Old Rumania	Eastern Front	by October 1943
63,000-65,000 Bulgarians	Northern Dobrudja	Bulgarian-incorporated South Dobrudja	November-December 1940
Smaller Groups of Bulgarians (31059)	Banat	Bulgaria proper	October 1943

RESTRICTED

Table 3. POPULATION DISPLACEMENT OF RUMANIA (continued)

Number	From	To	Date
15,593 Magyars	Soviet-incorporated North Bukovina	Hungarian-annexed Yugoslav province of Backa	June 1941
1,631 Magyars	Moldavia	Hungarian-annexed Yugoslav province of Backa	----
14,454 Jewish refugees and Soviet-minded Rumanians	various parts of Rumania	Soviet-incorporated Bessarabia and North Bukovina	June 1940
Several thousand Jewish refugees	"	"	January 1941
100,000 to 130,000 Jews	Rumanian re-conquered Bessarabia and North Bukovina	Soviet Russian proper	July 1941
200,000 Jews	Bessarabia, North Bukovina and Old Rumania	Transnistria and further east	October 1941
an unascertained number of Gypsies	various parts of Rumania	Transnistria	----
110,000 Rumanian repatriates	Bulgarian-incorporated South Dobrudja	North Dobrudja, Bessarabia, North Bukovina	December 1940
202,233 Rumanian refugees	Hungarian-annexed Northern Transylvania	South Transylvania and various parts of Rumania	1940-41

(31059)

RESTRICTED

Table 3. POPULATION DISPLACEMENT OF RUMANIA (continued)

Number	From	To	Date
35,000 to 40,000 Rumanian refugees	Soviet-incorporated Bessarabia and North Bukovina	various parts of Rumania	June 1940
a number of Rumanian officials and civilians	Transnistria and Bessarabia	"	November 1943
4,500 to 5,000 Rumanian civilian workers	various parts of Rumania	Germany	-----
3,000 to 5,000 Russian emigrés	various parts of Rumania	to the eastern front	August-September 1943
4,000 Polish refugees	Poland	various parts of Rumania	September 1939
a small number of Swedes	Old Rumania	Sweden	Autumn of 1943

RESTRICTED